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INTRODUCTION
The most common form of patent infringement is direct infringement, a
strict liability claim. One directly infringes a patent simply by making,
using, or selling a product, or practicing a method that meets all the
limitations of a patent claim. No fault is necessary. There are other
infringement doctrines, however, that require some form of fault.1
Principal among these are indirect infringement, which occurs when one
engages in behavior that aids or encourages another to infringe a patent,
and willful infringement, which requires culpability above and beyond
merely engaging in the infringing acts.2 In both cases simply carrying out
the relevant acts is insufficient to establish liability.3 Rather, the accused
1. By “fault,” I simply mean the component of the legal claim that makes it something
other than a strict liability claim. As this Article will explain, fault may be a particular
mental state requirement, such as intent or knowledge, or it may be an objective analysis,
such as negligence or civil recklessness. See discussion infra Part I.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
3. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
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party must possess some type of fault with respect to the infringement.4
The traditional approach to the fault elements of indirect infringement
generally includes a mens rea, or mental state, inquiry.5 Inducement of

(requiring proof of intent to induce infringement of the patent), aff’d on other grounds, 131
S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
4. Id.
5. Virtually all commentators addressing the subject of indirect infringement, both
with respect to inducement and contributory infringement, treat the subject of fault in mental
state terms. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
225, 241–46 (2005) (grappling with elements of inducement of infringement while
proposing that infringement be determined based on a sliding scale that weighs the degree of
mental culpability together with the degree of participation in the act to determine whether a
given set of circumstances constitutes inducement). While Professor Lemley’s work
provides valuable insights (and the mechanism he proposes could work in conjunction with
the revised view of fault), a key pillar of his analysis is the treatment of the fault
requirement in mental state terms. Other commentators also consistently describe the fault
element in mental state terms. See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a
Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635, 661–62 (2008) (defining the mental state
required for inducing infringement as a specific intent to induce the direct infringer’s acts
that constitute infringement and that the infringer knew or should have known the direct
infringer’s acts would be infringing); Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search
Engines: The Questionable Role of Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement Doctrine,
2009 BYU L. REV. 783, 785–86 (2009) (discussing the mental state element of contributory
and inducement infringement in light of criminal law notions of accomplice liability);
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 405–06 (2006) (explaining mental state of infringer as
willful infringement, where there is actual notice of the patent but the infringer nonetheless
chooses to infringe). An alternative view is that inducement should be a strict liability
claim, at least with respect to the fault associated with the question of infringement. See
Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Patent Law:
Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 245 (2006) (arguing
that any standard less than strict liability will cast doubt on a patent holder’s ability to
protect its rights); Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe:
Why the Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under §
271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299 (2001) (arguing in favor of strict liability with respect to the
question of infringement); Ted Sichelman, Minding Patent Infringement 25–28 (San Diego
Legal Studies, Paper No. 11–051, 2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR
_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=592341 (essentially arguing the same
standard). Rather than advocating for an objective approach to fault with respect to
infringement, however, these commentators effectively propose the elimination of the fault
requirement entirely. To be clear, I do not suggest that this strict liability approach should
be adopted; to the contrary, I argue that fault for indirect infringement should be preserved,
but as an objective recklessness analysis as opposed to an inquiry into whether the accused
possessed the subjective mental state of purpose or knowledge.
Traditional approaches to willful infringement also viewed its fault element as a mental
state inquiry. See, e.g., Norfin, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 625 F.2d 357, 366 (10th Cir.
1980) (focusing on whether infringement was “willful” and “deliberate”). Yet, as this
Article will discuss, this is no longer the case. Willfulness is now widely understood as
involving a purely objective analysis. See Justin P. Huddleson, Note, Objectively Reckless:
A Semi-Empirical Evaluation of In re Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 120–21
(2009) (discussing post-Seagate trends in the law); Justin McCarthy, Note, In re Seagate:
One Step Closer to a Rational Doctrine, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355, 370 (2009)
(explaining that the test is now one of “objective recklessness”); Christopher C. Bolten,
Note, In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C.: Is the Objective Recklessness Standard a Practical
Change?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 73, 73–90 (2008); Christopher Ryan Lanks, Note, In re
Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111 W. VA. L.
REV. 607, 620 (2009) (outlining the new objective recklessness standard).
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infringement, one form of indirect infringement, illustrates this approach.
In its simplest terms, inducement of patent infringement occurs when one
engages in an act that causes another to infringe a patent.6 For example, a
pharmaceutical company that sells birth control pills with instructions on
how customers can use those pills to treat acne and advertises those pills
for treating acne may be subject to a claim that it is inducing infringement
of a patent covering the use of birth control pills to treat acne. Although
the company itself is not directly infringing the patent, it is engaging in
conduct that results in the direct infringement of the patent by another.
Beyond just the relevant acts, however, inducement also requires the
patent holder to establish fault on the part of the accused. Fault for
inducement is virtually always described in mens rea terms.7 For example,
the Federal Circuit, citing en banc, recently articulated the fault element for
inducement as requiring that “the patentee must show . . . that the alleged
infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another’s infringement.”8 Such an inquiry is thus a question
about the subjective state of mind of the accused party.
Even the Supreme Court assumes that fault in inducement must require a
mental state inquiry. In the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in GlobalTech v. SEB S.A.,9 the Court posed the question “[w]hether the legal
standard for the ‘state of mind’ element of a claim for actively inducing
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is ‘deliberate indifference of a
known risk’ that an infringement may occur or instead ‘purposeful,
culpable expression and conduct’ to encourage an infringement.”10 The
Court’s question presupposed that the fault element of inducement must be
described in mental state terms, asking whether the accused infringer must
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
7. See supra note 5.
8. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (quoting MEMC
Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d at 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1282) (emphasis added), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). There
are a multitude of similar articulations of the fault element by the Federal Circuit, all
involving questions of mental state. For example, another version of the fault element is
that “[i]nducement requires a showing that the alleged inducer knew of the patent, knowingly
induced the infringing acts, and possessed a specific intent to encourage another’s
infringement of the patent.” Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328, 92
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The
common theme of these standards is that they all involve an investigation into whether the
accused party either intended to infringe the patent or subjectively knew that the conduct
infringed.
9. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617
(Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 458 (Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 10-6).
10. See id. (granting certiorari to determine whether the legal standard for inducement
is deliberate indifference of a known risk that infringement may occur or purposeful,
culpable expression and conduct to encourage an infringement), question presented
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/10-00006qp.pdf.
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possess a certain “state of mind,” be it one of deliberate indifference or
purposeful conduct. Given this preconception, it is unsurprising that the
Court’s opinion in Global-Tech concluded that inducement requires
knowledge of infringement, a holding that it necessarily tempered with the
invocation of the problematic concept of “willful blindness.”11
Given the prevalence of this view, one might suppose that it is the
correct approach. Indeed, in the historical context in which inducement
was developed, the late 1800’s, articulating fault in terms of intent made
perfect sense.12 Inducement was, after all, an expansion of the tort doctrine
of aiding and abetting, an intentional tort.13 Nor was the concept of intent
necessarily difficult to apply to patent infringers in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.14 It is even conceivable that questions of
infringement and validity were less obfuscated than they have become over
the past thirty years.15
Yet despite the consensus understanding that fault for indirect
infringement involves a mental state inquiry, it has proven highly
troublesome to courts and scholars.16 Even after the Federal Circuit
theoretically settled the mental state requirement of inducement once and
for all in DSU Medical v. JMS,17 subsequent panels and scholars continued
to disagree on its interpretation.18 Indeed, one commentator has suggested
11. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (likening
such knowledge to that required for a finding of contributory infringement in Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964)).
12. See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Works, 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir.
1897) (providing a summary of relevant caselaw).
13. Id.
14. E.g., id. at 714, 723 (reciting that the individual defendant admitted to selling a
patented object and inferring intent merely from the sale of patented items).
15. See generally R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?:
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence,
THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 1, 33 (2009) (suggesting that Phillips effectively held
that patent claims will not always be interpreted to mean what they say).
16. See supra note 5 (providing varied examples of scholars’ attempts to define the
fault element of inducement in mental state terms).
17. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
18. The Federal Circuit’s discomfort with treating the fault element of inducement in
mental state terms can be seen in the variety of articulations in post-DSU opinions.
Compare i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943,
1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon
Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (“The
patentee must show . . . that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and
possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement”) with Vita-Mix Corp. v.
Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added) (stating that “[i]nducement requires a
showing that the alleged inducer knew of the patent, knowingly induced the infringing acts,
and possessed a specific intent to encourage another’s infringement of the patent,” and that
such “[i]ntent can be shown by circumstantial evidence, but the mere knowledge of possible
infringement will not suffice). See generally SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594
F.3d 1360, 1376, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617, 1628 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations
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that the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Global-Tech v. SEB
S.A.19 was driven in part by an argument from the academy that the Federal
Circuit has been unable to solve the puzzle of the mental state required for
inducement.20
In this Article, I seek to explain why viewing fault as a mental state
inquiry is so problematic, and propose a new way to deal with the issue. In
my view, the fundamental mistake of previous analyses has been to assume
that tort law—especially as it existed in the late 1800’s—is directly
analogous to patent law. This assumption flies in the face of the fact that
the modern world in which patent infringement is assessed is vastly
different than it was a hundred years ago and the fact that the context of
patent infringement is significantly different from the world of tort law.
Accused inducers of infringement are not individuals and small companies
but giant, multi-national corporations.21 Determining whether given
conduct infringes a patent is now a vastly more complicated, uncertain
process.22
Perhaps the strongest reason why treating the fault element of indirect
infringement in mens rea terms is flawed is the fundamental difference
between intentional torts versus patent infringement. In the context of
intentional torts, the mental state inquiry is predominantly concerned with
whether the actor desires or appreciates the predictable factual
consequences of a given act. For instance, A can be liable for the
intentional tort of battery as long as A intends to strike B, regardless of
omitted) (“[I]nducement requires a showing of ‘specific intent to encourage another’s
infringement’ . . . [and] ‘specific intent’ in the civil context is not so narrow as to allow an
accused wrongdoer to actively disregard a known risk that an element of the offense
exists.”), aff’d sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
True indecision as to the correct standard, however, is demonstrated by Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcom Inc., in which the court stated that “intent may be established where an alleged
infringer who ‘knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements,’
is shown to have induced infringing acts through his actions.” Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617
(Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 458 (Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 10-6).
20. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Supreme Court to Hear Case on Inducing
Patent Infringement, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 12, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2010/10/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-inducing-patent-infringement.html
(explaining that the petition for certiorari was aided by a brief arguing that the Federal
Circuit has been unable to clarify the law on the state of mind requirement for inducement
liability); Brief for 41 Law, Economics, and Business Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010)
(No. 10–6), 2010 WL 5069528, at *8.
21. There are, of course, still inducement claims made against individuals, primarily in
the context of attempts to pierce the corporate veil. E.g., Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated
Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1315–16, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1626 (Fed.
Cir. 2010). But there are numerous instances where corporations are accused of
inducement, as in Global-Tech.
22. See generally Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 15, at 33.
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whether or not A knows that striking B constitutes battery.
Indirect infringement, on the other hand, focuses on an appreciation of
the legal consequences of a given act. Moreover, the current approach to
fault in the context of indirect infringement examines the actor’s state of
mind with respect to violating a law—not simply whether the actor
intended to cause the underlying acts that violated the law.23 The problem
is that no one intends to infringe a patent. A person may intend to make or
sell a particular product or may even intend to copy another person’s
technology. But except in a few extreme (and largely absurd) situations, no
one’s purpose is to infringe a patent. Yet this is precisely how the fault
element in indirect infringement is largely articulated.24
Nor is the alternate mental state construct of “knowledge” viable, despite
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling to the contrary.25 Knowledge is typically
established when one is substantially certain of particular consequences.
However, given the uncertainties associated with patent law, one can
virtually never be certain that conduct infringes a patent short of a final
judgment.26
This Article thus suggests that the conventional approach is the wrong
view of the fault element of indirect infringement, both in its contributory
infringement and inducement forms. Rather than attempting to see these
doctrines as requiring a culpable state of mind vis-à-vis infringement of a
patent, I propose that an analysis more relevant to the present context of
patent infringement is necessary. The lynchpin of the revised view of fault
is the recognition that infringement is a probabilistic assessment that is
virtually never certain. Essentially, this Article proposes that the fault
element of indirect infringement should be articulated as an objective, riskbased inquiry, asking whether a high risk that the relevant conduct
infringed a patent would have been obvious to a person in the accused
party’s place. This approach is similar to the modern tort concept of
objective recklessness, but is more closely linked to the patent context.
Among the benefits of applying an objective risk-based approach is the
23. See supra note 5 (discussing fault in terms of mental state).
24. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1943, 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005)), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
25. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068, (2011) (failing
to differentiate between knowledge of a patent’s existence and knowledge that induced acts
constitute infringement).
26. Global-Tech illustrates this point neatly. In its opinion, the Court likened the fault
element of inducement of infringement to that of a salesman’s inducement of a customer to
buy a damaged car, posing the question of whether the salesman knew that the car was
damaged. Id. at 2065 (emphasis added). But as discussed in Part III.C.2, while it is
reasonable to ask whether one knew that a car is damaged, knowledge is a much more
elusive concept when it comes to questions of patent infringement.
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ability to engage in fine-tuning of the deterrence effects of the inducement
doctrine. Treating fault as requiring either purpose or knowledge offers, at
best, a crude mechanism for obtaining the optimal level of deterrence
because it is bound by the subjective mind of the accused infringer and
requires a near certain probability of infringement.27 By employing an
objective standard of fault that can be adjusted to account for high and lowrisk activities, the inducement doctrine can be more precisely set to achieve
optimal deterrence of activities that lead to patent infringement.
Benefits aside, not only does this Article suggest that an objective view
of fault is the correct approach, it argues that it is the normative standard
actually being applied in practice—irrespective of the courts’ formal
articulation of the legal standard.
Formally shifting from a subjective mental state-based view of fault for
patent infringement is not an outlandish suggestion. In fact, it has already
been done in the context of willful infringement. Although fault for willful
infringement was traditionally seen as involving a mens rea inquiry, recent
articulations of the doctrine have shifted toward an objective risk-based
analysis similar to the one I propose here.28 A comparable approach would
be beneficial in the indirect infringement context.
The first part of this Article sets out the foundational concepts that I will
use when discussing fault and mental state issues. Part II provides a
description of the fault elements in indirect infringement and willful
infringement, and explains how their historical context shaped the view of
these elements as involving an inquiry into the accused party’s state of
mind. Part III offers several reasons why this traditional view of fault is
unworkable and is premised on the assumption that mental state concepts in
tort are easily transferrable to patent law. In Part IV, I present an
alternative approach to fault in patent infringement akin to objective
recklessness. Part V explains how this objective inquiry would work,
including its benefits with respect to deterrence, and offers some
suggestions as to factors that should be considered in its application.
I.

FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS OF FAULT
A. Elements of a Legal Claim

Before venturing into a discussion of the fault elements of indirect

27. Or it requires the court to engage in fuzzy logic and use ambiguous standards,
which fail to provide any clear rules on which firms can base their behavior. See infra Part
III.D.
28. Before proceeding too far along the path of the willful infringement recklessness
inquiry, however, it is important to point out that the post-In re Seagate application of that
analysis suffers from a significant identity crisis. See infra Part V.C.
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infringement, it is useful to establish some basic points to ensure a common
understanding of fault. At the highest level, the elements of a legal claim
can be divided into two types: physical elements and fault elements.29 The
latter can be further split into mental fault (also referred to as “mens rea”),30
which covers the subjective mental culpability required for the claim,31 and
objective forms of fault such as negligence or recklessness.32
The basic concept of mental fault is readily illustrated in the criminal
context:33 if A shoots and kills B, A has met the physical element of intentto-kill murder; if A’s purpose in shooting B was to kill him, he has met the
mental state element as well.34 Objective fault, on the other hand, does not
29. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, 333–35 (2d ed. 2003)
(outlining the general elements of a crime).
30. Id. at 332–35 (discussing the basics of mens rea); CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL LAW, 164–72 (15th ed. 1993) (describing “mental state”); see also Paul H.
Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: the Model
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 685–87 (1983) (explaining the development
of mens rea). Although “mens rea” evokes an image of criminal law, its usage appears in
civil law as well. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130
S. Ct. 1605, 1630 (2010) (discussing the appropriate mens rea standard in the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, a statute providing for civil liability for certain prohibited debt
collection practices); Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What
Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 271–
79 (2008) (discussing the notion of mens rea standards in tort law); V.S. Khana, Is the
Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 355, 366–69 (1999) (discussing the idea of corporate mens rea in the context of both
civil and criminal liability). Even patent law commentators and courts occasionally adopt it.
See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 800; Eric L. Lane, The Federal Circuit’s
Inducement Conflict Resolution: The Flawed Foundation and Ignored Implications of DSU
Medical, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 198, 213 (2007); Ben Morgan, Joint
Infringement and the Impact of BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 12 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 173, 174 (2009); Andrew M. Newton, Encouraging Willful Infringement?
Knorr-Bremse Leaves Due Care in Patent Litigation in a State of Flux, 15 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 91, 96 (2007); see also BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d
1373, 1381, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that contributory
infringement “requires a mens rea (knowledge)”). For purposes of this Article, I treat
“mental state” and “mens rea” interchangeably.
31. LAFAVE, supra note 29, at 332.
32. Id. at 332, 365.
33. Periodically, I will use examples from the criminal law context to make a point or
illustrate how mens rea works. These examples are useful because many people have a
clearer understanding of mental culpability when viewed in the criminal context as opposed
to the civil context, in part because mental culpability in the criminal context has been
subject to substantially more scholarly examination and discussion, and perhaps also due to
the popular culture’s treatment of the subject. Regardless of whether the example is civil or
criminal, however, the underlying principles in my examples are largely the same, except
where noted.
34. LAFAVE, supra note 29, at 340–41. This is an overly simplistic example; in reality,
the mens rea element can be satisfied in a variety of ways. For example, Mr. Red may
satisfy the mental state requirement if he merely sought to cause grievous harm to Mr. Grey
but knew that his actions were nearly certain to result in Mr. Grey’s death, or if he intended
to kill Ms. Blue, who moved at the last moment causing him to hit Mr. Grey. Id. The core
point, however, is that mental culpability involves an inquiry into the state of mind of the
accused party and, when the outcome itself is not desired, typically involves a probability of
a given outcome that is near certainty.
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depend on the subjective state of mind of the accused party and typically
involves a probability of a given consequence that is less than near
certainty.35
Just as crimes can be divided into physical and fault elements, so too can
tort and patent law claims be separated into similar components. For
example, contributory infringement (another form of indirect infringement)
includes both physical and fault elements.36 Contributory infringement
involves the selling of a component of a patented machine or process
(physical element), constituting a material part of the invention (physical
element), but not including staple articles of commerce (physical
element).37 In addition, the defendant must know that the component is
especially made or adapted for use in infringing a patent (fault element).38
Both the physical and fault elements of the claim must be met for the patent
holder to prevail.39
In the tort context, claims can be conceived of as falling into one of three
categories based on the type of fault required. In one category are the
intentional torts, such as assault, battery, aiding and abetting the
commission of a tort, and intentional interference with contract.40 A
second category includes torts that require objective fault: negligence, and
in a handful of cases, recklessness.41 And in the third category are strict
liability torts: torts that lack any fault element.42 The strict liability
standard applies in cases such as the keeping of wild animals: any harm
caused by those animals is actionable, regardless of the subjective state of
mind of the defendant or the degree of care that was exercised,43 and is
perhaps best described as the absence of a fault requirement.
B. Mental Culpability in the Tort Context: Intent, Purpose and
Knowledge
Given this Article’s assertion that the fault component of indirect patent
infringement is viewed in mental state terms, largely due to its origins as an
35. Id. at 333–34.
36. Id. at 332.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 3–4, 338–39 (4th ed. 2010)
(providing a basic overview of intentional torts).
41. Id. at 59. Intentional infliction of emotional distress straddles the line between
objective torts and intentional torts, in that its fault component can be satisfied by
recklessness. See id. at 26 (explaining intent or recklessness to cause severe mental
distress).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 251. Note that this rule is not universal, as some jurisdictions follow a
negligence approach to the keeping of wild animals. See id. (discussing an action where
strict liability was chosen over negligence for policy reasons).
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adaption of the intentional tort of aiding and abetting, the next question
concerns what those tort mental state principles actually are. In other
words, when scholars and attorneys speak of mental culpability in the tort
context, what are they actually referring to?
In the late 1800’s, the period in which indirect infringement doctrines
came into being, mental culpability in the intentional tort context revolved
around the notion of “intent.”44 For example, the tort of battery involved
“the unpermitted application of force by one man to another.”45 Negligent
conduct was insufficient; “[t]here is no battery . . . unless the blow itself
was intentional.”46 Thus, in Talmage v. Smith,47 a case of transferred
intent, the defendant threw a stick at two of the plaintiff’s companions, but
instead struck the plaintiff in the eye.48 Despite the defendant’s claim that
he did not see the plaintiff, much less intend to hurt him, the court held that
all that was required was “an intention on the part of the defendant to hit
somebody, and to inflict an unwarranted injury upon some one.”49 In this
context, the word “intent” seems relatively clear: intent to cause the
undesired contact, or perhaps even intent to cause harm to another.
Subsequent articulations of the concept further refined the meaning of
intent. The modern understanding sees intent as composed of two types:
purpose and knowledge.50 “Purpose” means that “the actor desires to cause
44. See, e.g, MELVIN MADISON BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS FOR THE USE
155 (6th ed. 1894) (explaining the tort of battery in terms of intent).
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id. at 155.
47. 59 N.W. 656 (Mich. 1894).
48. Id. at 657.
49. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. OF PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1, at
3–4 (2005). An alternative approach to intent, applied by both commentators and courts,
employs the concepts of “specific intent” and “general intent.” See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he patentee must show . . . that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement
and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”) (emphasis added), aff’d
on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Sichelman, supra note 5, at 5–6 (arguing that
inducement should require only specific intent to cause the acts, not knowledge of the
patent). I find the courts’ use of “specific intent” to be so imprecise, however, as to be
useless in any rigorous analysis of fault in the patent infringement context. One criminal
treatise, for example, notes the diverse meanings of the terms. LaFave notes that “general
intent” can be used generically to mean “criminal intent,” or to encompass all types of
intent, or to mean intent to act on an undetermined occasion. LAFAVE, supra note 29, at
353–54. Similarly, “specific intent” can be used to mean the “mental state required for a
particular crime,” or to refer to one type of intent, or to refer to “denote an intent to do that
thing at a particular time,” or “to designate a special mental element which is required above
and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” Id. None
of this is particularly helpful in understanding the fault requirement of patent infringement.
Indeed, outside of patent law, although it persists in both the law and commentary, the use
of “specific intent” has been condemned as antiquated and confusing. See, e.g., Baruch
Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the
Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1376–96, 1411–14, 1465
(criticizing the notion of “specific intent” in detail, and concluding that “phrases like
OF STUDENTS
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the consequences of his act,” while “knowledge” means that “the actor . . .
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from [the
act].”51 When purposeful conduct is involved, the actor does not care that
there is a risk of failure; in other words, A, desiring to kill B, might shoot B
from a thousand feet away. A’s purpose is to kill B, something that is
unchanged despite the high likelihood that A’s shot will fail to do so. For
conduct to be knowledgeable, the actor’s desire is irrelevant—she must
instead appreciate that a particular outcome is “substantially certain.”52 For
example, consider a company that runs a smelting machine. As part of the
smelting process, the machine emits a harmful chemical. While the
company may not desire the emission of the harmful chemical, it
nevertheless possesses substantial certainty, and hence knowledge, that

“specific intent” and “willfully” are quite ambiguous and, at times, have misled those courts
trying to ascertain the mental states of the aider and abettor and the causer).
Thus, although “specific intent” persists in legal articulations of the mental state elements
in patent law, its usage is often nothing more than an empty incantation of a half
meaningless phrase that, in the end, requires the court to apply the concepts of purpose,
knowledge, and recklessness. See also id. at 1489–90 (emphasis added) (focusing directly
on those concepts, which have much more widely agreed upon meanings and allow the
discussion to be about degree of fault as opposed to one about definitions).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. OF PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1
(2005) (“A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with
the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the
consequence is substantially certain to result.”). The accompanying commentary indicates
the authors’ desire to differentiate between “purpose” and “knowledge.” This bifurcation
constitutes a more modern approach to the concept of intentional conduct in tort. See
Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061,
1063 (2006) (explaining that “‘intent’ to produce a consequence means either the purpose to
produce that consequence or the knowledge that the consequence is substantially certain to
result.”); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in
Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1150–51 (2001)
(referring to the bifurcation as “desires” and “believes”). The definitions in the Model Penal
Code formulation of criminal law context are similar; one acts “purposely” or
“intentionally” when “it is his conscious object to cause such a result.” MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). One acts “knowingly” if “he is aware that it
is practically certain that his conduct will cause a result.” Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
A note on the use of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Although at least one
commentator uses earlier versions of the Restatements, such as the Restatement (First) of
Torts, when analyzing the intent requirement for inducement because it was the version of
the Restatement in effect at the time of the relevant statute, see Sichelman, supra note 5, at
10, I suggest that the refinements of subsequent Restatements provide insights that are
overwhelmingly useful when analyzing questions of fault and intent.
52. As the Supreme Court held in Global-Tech, “knowledge’ can also be established
through “willful blindness,” a concept discussed further in Part II.A. As Justice Kennedy
noted in the Global-Tech dissent, however, “willful blindness” is an elusive notion, and one
whose use is not nearly so widespread as the opinion for the Court suggests. See GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2072–73 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citing Deborah Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 CRIM. L. &
PHILOSOPHY 301, 305–08 (2009); David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957
(1999); LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 34–35 (2009); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART § 57 at 157 (2d ed. 1961).
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running the machine will cause it to emit the harmful chemical.53 But
substantial certainty is different from a high likelihood.54 For example, a
police officer chasing a speeding car that is actively attempting to escape
may be aware of a significant likelihood that someone will suffer physical
harm during the chase, but is not substantially certain that harm will
occur.55 Substantially certain means quite certain—in other words,
virtually or practically certain, not merely highly probable.56
C. Alternate Approaches to Fault
Thus far, I have discussed only subjective forms of fault, and have
assumed that fault is determined on a per claim basis. Yet, not all fault is
subjective, and not all claims involve a single fault element.57
1.

Objective forms of fault
The most common type of objective fault is the concept of negligence,
which involves the question of whether the defendant acted like a
reasonable person would under the same or similar conditions.58 The
analysis is objective in the sense that it is based on the conduct of a
reasonable person as opposed to the defendant herself, and typically
involves a moderate risk—an unreasonable risk.59 Thus, for example, a
driver traveling carelessly down the street is liable if he collides with
another car, even if his purpose was not to strike the other car and he did
not even see the other car.60
An alternate form of objective fault is recklessness.61 Recklessness is
loosely defined as involving a higher risk than negligence that is even more
apparent to a reasonable person than the negligent risk would be.62 Civil
recklessness asks whether a reasonable person would recognize a high
probability that certain consequences will follow from the conduct. In the
tort context, it has been defined as “an unreasonable risk” of harm to
53. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. OF PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1,
illus. 3 (2005) (knowingly causing harm, even when the result is undesired or regretted, is
still intentional).
54. Id., illus. 4.
55. Id.
56. See id. § 1, cmt. a (noting that “practically certain” or “virtually certain” may be
used interchangeably with “substantially certain”).
57. See infra Part III.C.1, C.2.
58. DIAMOND, supra note 40, at 46–47 (summarizing the development of the negligence
standard of care).
59. Id. at 62.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281, illus. 2 (1965).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. OF PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 2,
cmt. a (2005) (showing the possibility of “gross negligence” which in some cases is equated
to recklessness). But recklessness is better understood to mean “negligence that is
especially bad,” a meaning that is less than recklessness. Id.
62. Id.
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another that is “substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
[the] conduct negligent.”63 A more recent articulation states that a person
acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows
facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves
burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to
render the person’s failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the
person’s indifference to the risk.64

Thus, in the tort context, recklessness is an objective inquiry, but actorcentric, in that it is based on the facts that were available to the actor at the
time, and differs from negligence in that it involves an obvious high risk.65
Examples of recklessness are necessarily context dependent. For
instance, it may be reckless to drive at a high speed through a residential
neighborhood, but that same conduct may not be reckless if the driver is in
an ambulance with blaring sirens carrying a patient in critical condition.66
Likewise, it may be reckless to swing a heavy wooden club in an arc
around oneself, but perhaps not if the swinger is standing in a batter’s box
attempting to hit a pitch. In each assessment, however, the crux of the
inquiry focuses on the degree of risk and the likelihood that a person in the
actor’s position would recognize that risk.
2.

Multiple physical elements, multiple fault elements
In addition to the relatively recent formal articulation of recklessness,
modern conceptions of fault do not require that claims be limited to a single
fault element. Rather, just as claims can possess multiple physical
elements, so too can they possess multiple fault elements. Dividing the
elements of a claim into discrete physical and fault components is called
“element analysis,” a concept that originated in criminal law.67 It is a
particularly useful approach, as it allows one to easily discern the
relationship between the mental and physical elements of a legal claim.68
Although its roots lie in criminal law, it is a tool that is readily applicable to
the civil context, and is the most logical mechanism for approaching mens

63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Criminal recklessness is
somewhat similar, but incorporates a subjective component—the defendant must be aware
of the risk. In criminal recklessness, that notion is defined as “consciously disregard[ing] a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element . . . will result from the conduct.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. OF PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 2
(2005).
65. See id. (defining recklessness in terms of the person committing the act).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, cmt. a (1965).
67. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 30, at 703–04.
68. Id.
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rea issues.69
The concept of element analysis recognizes that a single offense may
require multiple forms of fault.70 For example, under the Model Penal
Code definition of indecent exposure, “[a] person commits a misdemeanor
if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire . . . he exposes his
genitals under circumstances in which he knows his conduct is likely to
cause affront or alarm.”71 Different elements require different degrees of
fault, including purpose and knowledge.
Element analysis can be contrasted with offense analysis, the traditional
approach to mental state requirements (including in patent law), in which
each offense has one state of mind requirement.72 Yet although offense
analysis has remained the dominant view of mens rea, it is sometimes not a
viable approach, especially where multiple mental state elements can exist
within a single claim.73 Although I do not argue that all aspects of criminal
law theory are applicable to patent law, the concept of element analysis is
especially useful when attempting to address the fault components of
indirect infringement, and inducement in particular.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF FAULT IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
In this Part, I describe the traditional view of the fault elements of three
infringement doctrines:
contributory infringement, inducement of
infringement, and willful infringement. I posit that this approach views
fault as a mens rea inquiry, requiring the patentee to prove that the accused
party possessed the purpose to infringe or knowledge that the relevant
conduct infringes a patent.74 This history reveals, however, that although
the fault elements of contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement continue to be viewed in mens rea terms, recent changes in
the willfulness doctrine (which contains a fault element strikingly similar to

69. See Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for SecuritiesRelated Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1575 (2006) (commenting that “[a]fter
recognizing the logic of ‘element analysis,’ one is forced to conclude that all talk about the
mens rea requirement for a criminal offense—or ‘offense analysis’—is literally
incoherent”).
70. Robinson & Grall, supra note 30, at 704.
71. Id. at 699 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (1980)).
72. Id. at 688.
73. Id. at 689.
74. To the extent the reader is familiar with these doctrines and agrees that their fault
elements are conventionally viewed in terms of knowledge or purpose (or simply is more
interested in the discussion as to why this approach is problematic), it may be preferable to
skip to Part III. In doing so, keep in mind that, for the purposes of inducement, this Article
draws a distinction between intent to cause the third party’s act to occur and fault with
respect to whether those acts infringe. It is the latter with which I am concerned.

RANTANEN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1590

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/11/2011 3:13 PM

[Vol. 60:1575

that of indirect infringement) have shifted it toward an objective inquiry.75
A. Indirect Infringement and Fault: Requiring a Culpable Mind
When most lawyers and scholars think of patent infringement, they think
of direct infringement. Direct infringement is a strict liability cause of
action: simply making, using, or selling a product, or practicing a method,
that meets all the limitations of a claim constitutes direct infringement,
irrespective of any fault on the part of the infringer.76 Thus, if A owns a
patent on a water pump, and B sells pumps meeting all the elements of a
claim of A’s patent, B is said to be directly infringing A’s patent. This is
because direct infringement requires no culpable state of mind or
objectively improper behavior, and B will be liable for directly infringing
A’s patent regardless of whether she knows that her pump infringes (or is
even aware of the patent at all), and regardless of any precautions she
might take.77
Other forms of infringement, however, require fault by the accused
party; principal among these is indirect infringement.78
Indirect
infringement encompasses behavior that, while not actually infringing
itself, nevertheless encourages, aids, or permits another to directly infringe
75. As there are several sources providing a complete description of the history of these
doctrines, I will not go into all the details of their development. See Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179 (1979) (analyzing whether the statute codified aspects
of contributory infringement and patent misuse that previously only existed in case law);
Adams, supra note 5, at 636–38 (explaining the development of the two doctrines); Charles
W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 371–76 (2006) (giving a summary of indirect liability for
patent infringement); Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution of Willful
Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 55–77 (2000) (presenting a detailed account
of the development of willful infringement).
76. I am simplifying direct infringement somewhat. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)
(stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes
the patent”).
77. See id. (under which direct infringement is a strict liability crime).
78. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 17.01 (1978) (summarizing the
requirement of knowledge and intent for indirect infringement). I am not suggesting,
however, that direct and indirect infringements are the only types of infringement. A patent
can also be infringed by submitting an application to the Federal Drug Administration for
various pharmaceuticals, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), as well as by importing, offering to sell,
selling or using within the United States a product made abroad by a process that is patented
in the United States, § 271(g). Both essentially involve “artificial” infringement—there is
no actual sale, etc. of a product under § 271(e)(2), and in the case of 271(g), the foreign
manufacture does not itself infringe a patent. See § 271(g) (implying that the foreign
manufacturer has to direct the suspect activity towards the United States before he can be
held as an infringer). In addition, § 271(f) provides for causes of action that are similar to
§§ 271(b) and 271(c) when the actual practice of the patent will take place abroad. See §
271(f) (establishing liable as infringers those whose activity abroad would constitute
infringement had it occurred within the United States). However, both are essentially
expansions of the core doctrine of indirect infringement.
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a patent.79 There are two principal types of indirect infringement: (1)
contributory infringement, which prohibits the provision of a critical
component of a patented invention that lacks substantial noninfringing
uses, and (2) inducement of infringement, which is directed generally to
acts that are intended to cause others to infringe a patent.80
The purpose of indirect infringement is to provide a remedy for patent
holders when it is impossible or inefficient for them to sue direct infringers,
and to deter parties from engaging in behavior that may result in the
infringement of a patent.81 As a general matter, society would prefer to
have patentees sue direct infringers. After all, direct infringers are the ones
engaging in the infringing conduct, and any harm ultimately flows from
their direct infringement.82 However, in some instances it may be
impractical to sue the infringing party, or the direct infringer may not be
the truly responsible party.83 The doctrine of indirect infringement imposes
liability in these cases.84 Indirect infringement also serves a deterrence
function, as it incentivizes parties to avoid or minimize conduct that results
in third-party infringement.85 However, indirect infringement’s ability to
deter must be balanced against the possibility of over-imposing liability on
those who participate in commerce.86
The element of fault distinguishes contributory and inducement
infringement from direct infringement.87
This fault element has
79. See § 271(b)–(c) (holding liable for infringement those who induce infringement, or
knowingly sell “material parts” of a patented products that have no other use but for
infringement).
80. Id.
81. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 228 (describing the purpose of secondary liability and
providing several examples to illustrate its application).
82. Cf. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851, 858–59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1641, 1644–47 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that to find indirect infringement, plaintiff must
ultimately demonstrate defendant’s customers were liable for direct infringement).
83. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 228 (providing examples of when it would be
impractical or futile to sue the party liable for direct infringement).
84. Cf. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1338, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005)) (analogizing to patent law the proposition that,
in the context of copyright infringement, enforcement against direct infringers may be
impractical or impossible).
85. See id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (arguing that it is more practical to allow
indirect infringement, as it is often hard to locate and to enforce rights against direct
infringers).
86. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 228 (commenting that “the law must take equal care to
avoid imposing liability on those who participate in the stream of lawful commerce merely
because their products can be misused”).
87. The primary purpose of this Article is to argue that subjective fault, in the context of
indirect infringement, should be replaced with an objective view that is narrowly tailored to
subject of patent infringement. While I will largely not address the viewpoint that indirect
infringement should require no fault at all with respect to whether the relevant conduct
infringes a patent, see supra note 5, no discussion of the fault element of inducement would
be complete without at least acknowledging this viewpoint. However, this is a minority
position, and the predominant view is that indirect infringement requires some form of fault.
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conventionally been expressed in mens rea terms of whether the accused
knew or intended that the relevant conduct infringe a patent.88 The
following sections will describe the origins and treatments of the element
of fault in these doctrines, and their respective inquiry into the mind of the
accused party.
1.

Contributory infringement and the knowledge requirement
The doctrine of contributory infringement imposes liability for the sale
or importation of a key component of a patented product or process,
provided that the component lacks a “substantial noninfringing use. . . .”89
Elaborating on the previous hypothetical, if A’s patented water pump
requires a particular valve that has no other purpose other than to be a part
of the claimed water pump, and C sells those valves to B for B to use to
make infringing water pumps, C may be liable as a contributory infringer.
However, liability for contributory infringement is not established by
simply selling components with a substantial noninfringing use. The law
requires that there be some form of fault on the part of the accused party
above and beyond just selling the component. This element has
conventionally been expressed as asking whether the accused party “knew”
that the component is “especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent.”90
The doctrine of contributory infringement has its origins in the late
nineteenth century, and is a judicial expansion of direct infringement via
application of traditional tort principles punishing individuals for aiding

Indeed, requiring fault for inducement serves an important purpose with regard to the
selection of defendants by a patent holder. While in some circumstances, it may be
impossible to sue the direct infringers of a patent, where companies are neutral as to whether
to sue the direct infringer or another potentially inducing party, the law would prefer them to
sue the direct infringer. See Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 443 F.3d at 858–59, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1644–47 (highlighting that if one is going to sue for indirect infringement they
must ultimately prove direct infringement). A heightened intent requirement accomplishes
this goal by pushing patent holders toward the direct infringer who is an easier target. See
also supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing further information on the subject of
strict liability for inducement).
88. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 488 (9th ed. 2009)
(internal citation omitted) (“Thus, in order to prove vicarious liability for indirect
infringement, a plaintiff who demonstrates direct infringement must also establish that the
defendant possessed the requisite knowledge or intent to be held vicariously liable.”).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (codifying the doctrine of contributory
infringement); see also CHISUM, supra note 78, § 17.03[3] (stating that prior to statutory
reform, courts did extend contributory infringement to all cases where a patent may have
been infringed). Again, I am simplifying a bit in order to focus primarily on the fault
element of this doctrine. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
90. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 527 (1964); cf.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (“we proceed on
the premise that §271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is
infringed”).
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and abetting a tort.91 The earliest articulation of contributory infringement
is Wallace v. Holmes,92 an 1871 district court decision involving a patent
covering an improved lamp that used a novel burner in combination with a
chimney.93 In Wallace, the patent holder sued a manufacturer of lamp
burners for infringement of its patent.94 Selling the burners alone was not
an act of infringement, as the court acknowledged a well-settled rule that a
patent for a combination “is not infringed by one who uses one or more of
its parts, but not all, to produce the same results . . . .”95 Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that this rule offered no protection against co-infringers,
who, acting in concert, each made and sold a part of the infringing
product.96 Hence, the court concluded that the defendant was liable for
aiding and abetting infringement because the defendant knew that the
burner could not be used without the chimney (a widely obtainable
component), and displayed assembled lamps in his window.97
Subsequent cases seized on this new doctrine of contributory
infringement, holding that it required some form of “intent” on the part of
the accused party—although the precise contours of that intent element
remained vague. The question that remained was what “intent” actually
meant. Did it mean intent that the component be used in a particular
manner, or intent that it be used to infringe a patent?98
This lack of clarity was likely due to the doctrine’s roots as an adaption
91. See Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 F. 105, 111
(6th Cir. 1904) (internal citation omitted) (likening contributory infringement to aiding and
abetting a trespass); see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721
(6th Cir. 1897) (noting that an infringement of a patent is a tort, and drawing upon tort
principles of aiding and abetting). See generally Adams, supra note 5, at 650–51
(summarizing the legal origin of indirect infringement); Lemley, supra note 5, at 227
(providing further information on the tort foundations of patent law principles of
infringement).
92. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
93. See Snyder v. Bunnell, 29 F. 47, 48 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (“The complainants
invoke the doctrine of contributory infringement, the clearest illustration of which is,
perhaps, found in Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatchf. 65.”).
94. See Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 75 (explaining that “the distinguishing feature of the
invention claimed was the burner”). However, the burner was not separately claimed, id. at
79, and the court suggested that the chimney was not novel, as it could be obtained from “all
the glass manufacturers in the world.” Id. at 80.
95. Id. at 80.
96. See id. (explaining why the traditional rule would allow for joint infringers to
escape liability because neither would technically be infringing a patented combination).
97. Id. at 79–80; see also Snyder, 29 F. at 48 (noting that the defendants in Wallace
knew that the burner could not be used without a chimney, and thus could not be used
without infringing the patent).
98. See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 101
(1890), available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/ip_antique_library/patent.asp
(“To make or sell a single element with the intent that it shall be united to the other
elements, and so complete the [infringing] combination, is infringement.”); see also ALBERT
H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 344–45
(4th ed. 1904) (describing the doctrine of contributory infringement). See generally infra
Part II.B (elaborating on the doctrine of willful infringement).
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of the tort principle of aiding and abetting. Liability for aiding and abetting
can be imposed when one gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
another person, knowing that the person’s conduct constitutes a breach of a
legal duty.99 For example, if a police officer advised other officers to use
illegal methods of torture on a particular suspect, the advising officer could
be liable for batteries that followed from that advice.100 Traditionally, it
has not mattered whether the abettor knew or intended that the conduct he
or she was assisting constituted a specific tort.101 Thus, when this tort
principle was applied to patent infringement, it may not have been readily
apparent that such an inquiry was necessary. Intent to cause the underlying
conduct and intent to infringe a patent may have been largely the same
thing, at least when seen as a form of aiding and abetting.
Contributory infringement thus came to be seen as a type of intentional
tort. The categorization as an intentional tort reinforced the view that the
fault requirement involved an inquiry into the mind of the accused party.
This mens rea approach remained unchanged, despite recognition that the
inquiry required some assessment of fault with respect to whether the
conduct actually infringed a legal question that was not part of the original
aiding and abetting schema. The most powerful manifestation of this view
is the codification of the doctrine in the 1952 patent act, followed by the
Supreme Court case Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co.102
The 1952 patent act codified numerous common law patent doctrines,
including contributory infringement. Along with the four physical acts
required for contributory infringement, the codification articulated the fault
element as requiring knowledge of the use to which the contributing
component would be put to.103 First, there must be an offer to sell or a sale
99. For example, one could be liable for aiding and abetting a trespass, so long as one
was involved in the underlying acts leading to the tort. Intent that the conduct constitute a
tort, on the other hand was not required. See Duane v. Goodall, 7 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (N.D.
Cal. 1863) (describing the intent requirement of a tort); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876 (1979) (articulating when one can be held liable for tortuous conduct through
acting concert with another).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. a, illus. 5 (1979) (providing
further context and several useful hypotheticals).
101. See id. cmt. d (clarifying that knowledge of the legal wrong being committed is
irrelevant, even for an intentional tort); see also Adams, supra note 5, at 640; infra Part III.C
(explaining how knowledge that conduct constitutes a tort is not a component of the fault
inquiry for intentional torts).
102. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
103. The original statute read:
Whoever [1] sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, [2] constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be [3] especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, [4] and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall
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of “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process . . . .”104 Second, that article must constitute a “material part of the
Third, the article must be used in a direct
invention . . . .”105
infringement.106 Finally, the article must not be a staple of “commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . . .”107 In addition, the
conventional view of contributory infringement requires that the accused
must “know” that the component or material or apparatus is “especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement” of the relevant
patent.108
In Aro, a bare majority of the Court clarified that for infringement,
knowledge of infringement was required, rather than mere knowledge of
the underlying conduct that the component would be used for.109 Justice
Black explained that an accused contributory infringer should not be liable
unless there is “knowledge that a patent covered [the infringing
embodiment] or that their conduct infringed or helped to infringe that

be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1952). The fault element has remained unchanged since 1952, and the
lone statutory modification occurred in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4988 (1994) (replacing
“sells” with “offer to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States”).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
105. Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 78, § 17.03[4] (noting that this element is often
inevitably met by a component that meets the other requirements).
106. CHISUM, supra note 78, § 17.04[1].
107. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
108. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc., v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S. 476,
488–90 (1964) (analyzing the ambiguous pre-Aro knowledge requirement). One could also
evaluate whether the other physical elements require some degree of intent, but courts have
never focused on that issue. While a court could construe these elements to involve no
mens rea elements at all and thus utilize strict liability, even if it were to require that the
accused “intended” to engage in the relevant acts, in most cases that would be a pointless
inquiry. Although the last element could be construed to involve some mental state
element—a defendant must know both that the component is especially made for use in an
infringement and is not a staple article of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use—and that interpretation would be contrary to the legislative history. See S. REP. NO. 821979, at 8 (1952) (“The sale of a component of a patented machine, etc., must constitute a
material part of the invention and must be known to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in the infringement before there can be contributory infringement, and
likewise the sale of staple articles of commerce suitable for noninfringement use does not
constitute contributory infringement.”).
109. The structure of the Court’s decision in Aro is unusually complicated. The
dissenters concluded that § 271(c) required knowledge of infringement. Aro, 377 U.S. at
524–28 (Black, J., dissenting). The plurality reasoned that it required only knowledge that
the component was designed for a particular use, but found that Aro knew that the
component would infringe the patent. Id. at 488–91 (plurality opinion). Justice White
agreed with the dissent that § 271(c) required knowledge of infringement, but ultimately
sided with the plurality that this standard was met. Id. at 514 (White, J., concurring). Of
particular interest is the fact that the dissenters also believed that “direct infringement”
should include a requirement that the defendant know the relevant conduct infringes. Id.
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patent.”110 Here, “knowledge” of infringement was established by a 1954
letter from the patentee to Aro informing it of the existence of the patent
and stating that it was obvious that anyone selling ready–made replacement
fabrics for the Ford convertibles would be guilty of contributory
infringement of the patent.111 However, the Court, as to pre–1954 tops,
remanded the case for a determination of whether Aro knew that the Ford
tops were patented and infringing before receiving the letter.112
The formal articulation of the fault element of contributory infringement
became frozen in time, and since Aro it has persisted virtually
unchanged.113 Indeed, post–Aro courts have consistently held the legal
requirement of fault as involving knowledge of infringement. For example,
in i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,114 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
finding of contributory infringement, concluding that a reasonable jury
could find that Microsoft “knew that the use of the editor would infringe the
[patent in suit] based on circumstantial evidence presented at trial.”115
However, all this raises the question of whether contributory
infringement requires actual knowledge that the relevant third party’s
conduct will infringe. I argue that not only are courts not applying this
standard, but they cannot apply this standard, an issue I will address in the
second half of this paper.
2.

“Intent” to infringe: inducement of infringement
Inducement of infringement is a much broader standard of indirect
infringement than contributory infringement, which applies only to a
narrow, precisely defined set of circumstances. In effect, inducement of
infringement is a catch-all for conduct that results in infringement of
patents, but does not fall into the narrow subset of contributory
infringement.116 Compared with contributory infringement, inducement
110. Id. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 489–90 (plurality opinion).
112. Id. at 491.
113. Although there are few, if any, cases in which the Supreme Court or Federal Circuit
concluded that there was no contributory infringement on the basis of the knowledge
element, courts continue to recognize it as part of the inquiry. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co.
v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 183 (1980) (“Petitioners did not cease manufacture
and sale of propanil after that patent [sic] issued, despite knowledge that farmers purchasing
their product would infringe on the patented method by applying the propanil to their
crops.”); cf. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (assessing Microsoft’s knowledge of infringement as part of the
contributory infringement analysis), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); cf.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
114. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds,
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
115. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959 (emphasis added).
116. The consensus view is that inducement of infringement began as a subset of
contributory infringement. Adams, supra note 5, at 652–53; Lemley, supra note 5, at 227.
However, the 1952 Act firmly constrained contributory infringement to the limited form that
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broadly prohibits activities that encourage others to infringe a patent, and
not just the sale of a component lacking a noninfringing use.117 For
example, if A had a patent on a novel method of landscaping with mulch,
and C were to sell mulch to B, along with instructions as to how to practice
A’s method, C could be liable for inducement of infringement.118
Inducement infringement, like contributory infringement, involved an
adaption of the tort theory of aiding and abetting.119 Seven years after
Wallace, a Massachusetts district court in Bowker v. Dows,120 faced the
problem of a defendant who sold a common component in soap making,
saponine extract, to brewers and soda makers, and advertised that its
customers could add it to carbonated beverages to stabilize the foam.121
Although saponine extract itself (which predated the patent)122 did not
infringe, the act of adding it to the beverages did.123 Despite recognizing
that the sale of an extract containing saponine would not infringe the
patent,124 the court reasoned that a “person who makes and sells the extract
for the express and avowed purpose of its use in the combination” would
infringe the patent.125 The holding in Bowker expanded the scope of
contributory infringement to cover not just those who supplied a
component whose only use was in infringing a patent, but also to those
people who sold any component—even one having noninfringing uses—if
they did so with the intent to produce the infringing combination.126
Thus, “intent” in the context of inducement primarily meant intent to
is discussed in this Article. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1952) (establishing the scope of
contributory infringement). Thus, I am largely elaborating on the narrower form of
contributory infringement involving a provision of a component lacking substantial
noninfringing uses. However, with inducement, I am largely referring to the broad post1952 form.
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”).
118. This hypothetical, drawn from Graham Paper Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 46 F.2d 881,
887, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 463, 470 (8th Cir. 1931), assumes that the mulch had a noninfringing use;
if it did not, C could also be liable for contributory infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(declaring that if there is no substantial noninfringing use then the party is liable for
contributory infringement).
119. See Adams, supra note 5, at 651–53 (comparing early nineteenth century cases to
demonstrate the development of the doctrine of inducement infringement).
120. 3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878).
121. Id. at 1071 (discussing the issues surrounding the patent in Bowker).
122. Although the opinion does not explicitly state that saponine (a/k/a saponin) extract
was not itself novel, it implies that it was not. Id. at 1072. In fact, saponin extracts have
been used for millennia for washing, a fact probably known to the court at that time. See,
e.g., JOSEPH E. MEYER, THE HERBALIST, at 278–79 (1934) (discussing “wild soapwort”
(a/k/a “saponaria”), which contains the compound saponin and produces a soap-like lather).
123. See Bowker, 3 F. Cas. at 1071 (elaborating on why adding saponin to beverages was
patented and unique).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Adams, supra note 5, at 651–53 (detailing the significance of Bowker and its
expansion of prior precedent).
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engage in the underlying acts, as opposed to fault with respect to whether
or not the conduct infringed a patent. Walker on Patents, a popular early
20th century treatise, describes the broad doctrine as imposing liability if
the defendant “knew or intended that the property furnished by him was to
be used in either of the infringing ways; he cannot defeat an action for
infringement, by showing that the furnished property could have been used
in some non-infringing way.”127
The 1952 patent act did not explicitly effect any change to the fault
element of inducement, and it did not explicitly mention any type of fault
component at all. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) states that “whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer,” which is openended language that could be interpreted to cover a broad array of activities
and fault types.128 However, subsequent courts interpreted this language to
require both physical acts and fault. The physical elements of inducement
consist of: (1) an act—such as providing instructions—that assists and
encourages another to engage in (2) conduct that (3) directly infringes.129 If
one of these physical elements is absent then there is not inducement
infringement.130
In addition to the acts required for inducement, courts interpreted §
271(b) to require fault on the part of the accused. However, at this point
the fault element underwent a significant change. It was transformed from
a general requirement that the accused party intend for the infringing acts
to occur, to a requirement that the accused possess some culpability with
respect to whether those acts infringed, and paralleled the Supreme Court’s
approach to contributory infringement in Aro.131 Thus, during the era prior
to the formation of the Federal Circuit, the majority of courts concluded
that inducement required not just intent that the infringing acts occur, but
also some form of fault (expressed in the form of mental culpability) with
127. WALKER, supra note 98, at 345 (emphasis added). Note that although Walker stated
this point in the context of contributory infringement, the treatise deals with the broad pre1952 category of contributory infringement, which encompasses what is now considered
contributory infringement and inducement of infringement. Also note that this point is
subject to some debate due to a lack of clarity in many decisions as to whether the defendant
knew that the relevant conduct infringed. Bowker, 3 F. Cas. at 1071. I am not aware,
however, of any pre-1952 cases in which lack of knowledge that the conduct infringed was
the basis for a finding of no inducement.
128. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
129. See HARMON, supra note 88, at 489, 496 (providing several helpful examples of
inducement infringement).
130. See CHISUM, supra note 78, § 17.04[1], [4]; HARMON, supra note 88, at 489–90, 496
(addressing the importance of demonstrating direct infringement to get liability for
inducement infringement, which admittedly is difficult to prove).
131. See, e.g., Electronized Chems. Corp. v. Rad-Mat, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 781, 784, 160
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 26, 28 (D. Md. 1968) (avoiding a direct decision on the degree of
knowledge and intent required by subsection (b) but citing Aro as an indication that the
requirement would be greater than “the mere intent purposely to do an act”).
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respect to whether the conduct infringed a patent.132
Yet some confusion persisted over the fault required for inducement,
perhaps driven by the vagueness of the term “intent,” and likely aided by
the conflict between the origins of inducement as an outgrowth of
intentional tort theory and the modern realities of patent infringement.
Two cases highlight this disagreement. The first (and ultimately prevalent)
view was provided in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc:133
The alleged infringer must be shown . . . to have knowingly induced
infringement. It must be established that the defendant possessed
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely that
the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
[inducement].134 The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged
infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should
have known his actions would induce actual infringements.135

The articulation in Manville illustrates the court’s struggle to define the
issue as a single mental state requirement, which admittedly is not an easy
task. Indeed, the court seemingly punted on the question of what degree of

132. Compare Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Prods. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 626–27, 145
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1965) (arguing that because the representative “lacked
knowledge of the alleged infringement by” the manufacturer, its solicitation of orders could
not be inducement) with Hauni Werke Koerber & Co., KG v. Molins Ltd., No. 73-404-R,
1974 WL 20172 at *171, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 168, 171 (E.D. Va. June 11, 1974)
(“Anticipating also the argument that an act of inducement, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 271(b),
requires a specific intent—i.e., knowledge that the product in question infringes on the
patent of another—the Court, again, does not necessarily agree.”). However, most cases and
commentators prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit agreed that inducement required
intent to infringe, not just intent for the infringing acts to occur. See, e.g., Water Techs.
Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(analyzing the accused party’s intent to induce infringement); Sims v. W. Steel Co., 551
F.2d 811, 817, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 71, 75 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding the inducer must be an
accessory before the fact to the infringement); Electronized Chems. Corp., 288 F. Supp. at
784, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 28 (internal citation omitted) (stating that “intent to infringe
continues to be an essential element.”); Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Jackson Vibrators, Inc., No.
63 C 2250, 1967 WL 7708, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 784 (N.D. Ill Feb. 7, 1967) (finding
intent once the defendant was informed of his infringement and proceeded anyway), rev’d,
393 F.2d 192, 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 294 (7th Cir. 1968); see also CHISUM, supra note 78, §
17.04[2] (declaring that prior to the 1952 reforms a greater showing of knowledge and intent
was needed to demonstrate induced infringement); Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the
Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 86, 119 (1971)
(summarizing that infringement is actionable when it results proximately and intentionally
from direct infringement).
133. 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
134. With respect to the mens rea associated with the acts themselves, the court states it
is necessary that “the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
inducement.” Id. at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594 (emphasis added). A party
presumably has knowledge of its own acts, and the court presumably intended to refer to
knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,
Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (replacing
“inducing” with “infringing” in the quotation).
135. Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594 (internal
citations omitted).
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fault should be required, ascribing two separate standards: that the
defendant possess the “specific intent to encourage another’s
infringement . . .” and that the defendant “know or should have known his
actions would induce actual infringements.”136 One is a subjective view,
and the other objective.
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,137 however, a decision
issued a few months before Manville, a Federal Circuit panel arguably
adopted a fault standard that required only intent to cause the infringing
acts.138 In Hewlett-Packard the court was faced with a set of circumstances
in which the accused did not intend for the direct infringer to carry out the
relevant acts (making grit wheel plotters).139 In concluding that there was
no infringement, the panel stated “that proof of actual intent to cause the
acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding
active inducement.”140 Although Hewlett-Packard did not address the issue
of whether the accused needed to also know whether the relevant conduct
infringed a patent,141 subsequent cases cited Hewlett-Packard for precisely
that proposition.142
At the heart of these contradictory articulations was the court’s failure to
recognize that there is not one, but three non-physical elements in
inducement, and that the key issue is the fault associated with the last of
those elements, which relates to whether the conduct infringes a patent.
Looking at inducement from an element analysis point of view, rather than
taking an offense analysis approach (as those concepts were discussed in
Part I.C.) reveals this fact.
Each of the physical elements of inducement has an associated nonphysical component. First, the accused must intend to engage in the acts
they commit—something that is rarely at issue because typically one
136. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594 (internal citation omitted).
137. 909 F.2d 1464, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
138. See id. at 1469, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528 (announcing that specific intent is
necessary to inducement).
139. Id. at 1469–70, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528–29.
140. Id. at 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
141. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1311, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1238, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added) (bemoaning that
Hewlett-Packard has been repeatedly misread to find that proof of intent for nothing more
than intent to do the act).
142. See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1364, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1004, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation,
325 F.3d 1306, 1318, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In both Moba
and Hewlett-Packard, we explained that ‘the only intent required of [the defendant] is the
intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement.’”); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(affirming inducement based on the defendant’s intent to cause the relevant acts); Moba,
325 F.3d at 1318, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (citing Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529) (“In this case, the only intent required of FPS is the intent to
cause the acts that constitute infringement . . . .”).
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intends to engage in one’s own physical acts.143 Second, the accused must
intend for the direct infringer to engage in the relevant acts.144 And third,
the accused must possess sufficient fault with respect to whether those acts
infringe.145
The Federal Circuit’s en banc resolution of the conflict between the
Hewlett-Packard and Manville lines in DSU146 can be seen as recognition
of this multi-element approach.147 In DSU, the Federal Circuit concluded
that inducement requires both intent to cause the infringing acts and some
degree of knowledge that those acts infringe.148 While the court
acknowledged that “intent to cause the acts which constitute the
infringement” is required,149 it explicitly adopted the requirement that the
accused intend that his “actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or

143. But see Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the
Problem of Insufficient Though Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 824 (2007) (proposing a
theory of constructive non-volition under which the accused infringer would only be liable
for voluntary acts). Although Professor Collins focuses on direct infringement, his proposal
could apply equally to the indirect infringement context.
144. HARMON, supra note 88, at 496; see also Adams, supra note 5, at 661 (summarizing
that the mens rea required to demonstrate liability for inducing infringement is specific
intent to cause direct infringement coupled with knowledge that the acts would constitute
infringement).
145. HARMON, supra note 88, at 497 (clarifying that “inducement requires evidence of
culpable conduct”).
146. See 471 F.3d at 1305–06, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247–48 (holding that the
district court was correct in instructing the jury that culpable conduct was required to prove
inducement infringement, and that mere knowledge was not sufficient).
147. See Adams, supra note 5, at 661–62 (providing useful summary of the implications
of DSU for inducement infringement). Similarly, although the Supreme Court did not
directly address this point in Global-Tech, it did distinguish between knowledge of the
intended acts and knowledge that those acts infringe, although it commented that the
“inducer obviously knows the action that he or she wishes to bring about.” Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011); cf. id. at 1270 (concluding that
the accused inducer was also “indisputably aware that its customers were selling its product
in this country.”).
148. See DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)) (describing the mens rea requirement of inducing infringement). One additional
benefit of this articulation is that it helps provide some context for the oft-repeated statement
that mere knowledge of infringing activities is insufficient. See Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Manville, 917 F.2d at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594)) (“[T]hat defendants
have ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not enough.”). To be
liable for inducement of infringement, the accused must also meet the element that it
intended to cause the acts themselves. See id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting
Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529)) (“[P]roof of actual
intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to
finding active inducement.”).
149. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting Hewlett-Packard,
909 F.2d at 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529); see also id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1247 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
936 (2005)) (affirming a jury instruction that required a demonstration of two separate mens
rea elements).
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should have known his actions would induce actual infringements.”150
However, DSU was still far from clear on how fault with respect to
infringement could be established. While the court appeared on the one
hand to adopt a “known or should have known” standard (an objective
approach), it elsewhere stated that “‘knowledge of the acts alleged to
constitute infringement’ is not enough.”151 The court held instead that
“specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.”152 In
addition, while the court further added that the “knew or should have
known” element of infringement “necessarily includes the requirement that
he or she knew of the patent,” the concurrence, at least, pointed out that the
opinion did not decide the scope of what constituted “knowledge of the
patent.”153 And while most subsequent cases continued to use the “intent to
infringe” language, at least two honed in on the “should have known”
language, thus further casting doubt on the correct standard for the fault
element.154
This was the background in which the Supreme Court decided GlobalTech v. SEB.155 Relying exclusively on the Court’s earlier ruling in Aro
that contributory infringement required knowledge of infringement, the
Court adopted a parallel requirement for inducement.156 Recognizing the
impossibility of a pure knowledge standard, the Court then invoked the
doctrine of “willful blindness,” a type of fault developed in the criminal
law context based on the idea that that “defendants cannot escape the reach
of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence

150. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (quoting Manville, 917 F.2d
at 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1594).
151. Id. at 1305, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at
1363, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491).
152. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1364, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491). The only reading of this language that is consistent with the
remainder of the opinion is that the “specific intent” and “action to induce infringement”
language refers to the twin mens rea requirements of intent to cause the acts and knowledge
that those acts infringe. However, post-DSU opinions have continued to use this vague
specific-intent language, as opposed to the clearer standard. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369,
1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that inducement requires
that the accused “knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to
encourage another’s infringement.”), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
153. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
154. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting the cases
utilizing “intent to infringe” and “should have known” in describing the infringement
element).
155. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
156. See id. at 2068 (stating that “[b]ased on this premise, it follows that the same
knowledge is needed for induced infringement under §271(b) . . . . Accordingly, we now
hold that induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induce acts
constitute patent infringement”).
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of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”157
Willful blindness requires that “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe
that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must
take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”158 Applying this
doctrine, the Court concluded that the accused inducer satisfied the
knowledge of infringement element of inducement.
The Court’s opinion in Global-Tech is questionable on several grounds.
As discussed above, both contributory infringement and inducement of
infringement require fault with respect to whether the relevant conduct
infringes a patent.159 Yet despite this common fault requirement, the
doctrines are analytically and functionally distinct.
Contributory
infringement is limited to a narrow set of precisely defined circumstances,
such as offering to sell, selling, or importing a component lacking
substantial noninfringing uses.160
Inducement of infringement
encompasses a far broader array of possible conduct.161 In return for the
narrower scope, however, a patent holder attempting to establish
contributory infringement does not need to prove that the accused party
intended for the underlying acts that constitute the infringement to occur—
that requirement is presumed because the conduct falls within the scope of
the narrowly defined circumstances. Inducement, on the other hand, does
require the patent holder to prove that the accused party’s conduct was
intended to cause the infringing acts—a trade off for encompassing a
broader range of conduct, including the sale of components that have
noninfringing uses. Thus, the blind application of the fault standard for
contributory infringement to that of inducement is itself problematic.
This is not to say that, at least with respect to fault as to whether the
relevant acts infringe, contributory infringement and inducement should not
apply the same standard, only that one automatically should not apply to
the other. Ultimately, both contributory infringement and inducement
require that the accused possess some degree of fault with respect to
whether the third party’s conduct infringes a patent.162 As I argue in Part
157. Id. at 2068–69.
158. Id. at 2070.
159. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (identifying a policy preference for suing
direct infringers over indirect infringers and justifying the need for some intent before
liability attaches).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (providing specific situations in which one can be liable
for contributory infringement).
161. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”).
162. As Professor Holbrook points out, with respect to future infringement, arguably
neither contributory infringement nor inducement requires the demonstration of fault. See
Holbrook, supra note 5, at 406 (explaining that “a good faith belief of non-infringement”
may be enough to avoid liability). For example, if A sues B for inducing C’s past
infringement, A must demonstrate that B knew that C’s conduct infringed a patent (or in the
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III, however, this determination of fault should not be seen as a question of
knowledge or purpose, but rather as involving an objective risk-based
inquiry.163
B. Cracks in the Conventional View of Fault: Willful Infringement
Like the indirect infringement doctrines, the concept of willful
infringement also incorporates a fault element relating to whether the
underlying acts infringe a patent.164 Although the fault element of willful
infringement was traditionally expressed in mens rea terms, recent shifts
have moved it toward an objective standard.
The basic concept of willful infringement is fairly straightforward.
Patentees are entitled to two possible remedies: damages for past
infringement165 and an injunction against future infringement.166 In
addition, a patentee may seek enhancement of damages of up to three times
its actual damages.167 The basis for this enhancement is not stated in the
alternate formulation proposed here, a high risk of infringement would have been obvious to
another in B’s position). But if A is suing B for inducing any future infringement C might
engage in (say, for example to obtain an injunction against B), then A will necessarily
obtain a judgment that C’s conduct infringes A’s patent—thus, necessarily providing B with
actual knowledge that C’s conduct infringes the patent. In short, when litigating over future
infringement, it should not be necessary to establish fault with respect to whether or not the
third party conduct infringes. Merely establishing that the conduct actually infringes should
be sufficient.
163. One might be tempted to look at Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), in which the Court articulated a copyright inducement theory
premised on patent law. Id. at 935–36. However, despite the Federal Circuit’s reliance on
Grokster in DSU to support its conclusion that inducement requires more than just intent to
cause the infringing acts, DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 2006), it adds little in the way of clarification
of the degree of knowledge of infringement required for inducement, see Grokster, 545 U.S.
at 936–37 (failing to address the level of knowledge required that would be enough meet the
requirement for infringement); see also Oswald, supra note 5, at 239 (“Given that Grokster
itself is such an opaque decision, we should be concerned that if the new standards set in the
copyright arena are now applied back to patent law, we will end up with less clarity in both
areas of the law.”). Another difficulty in applying Grokster is that it involves copyright law,
not patent law. In copyright law, the question of fault with respect to whether the conduct
infringes is unnecessary because copyright infringement is premised on the requirement that
the work actually be copied—which necessarily constitutes copyright infringement. In other
words, intent to cause copying of a protected work is the same as intent to cause copyright
infringement. In contrast, patent infringement does not require copying, nor does copying
another’s technology necessarily result in infringement (furthermore, the validity of the
patent is substantially less certain than the validity of a copyright, thus making the inquiry
even less predictable in patent law). In short, although the distinction between intent to
cause the relevant acts and intent to cause the relevant acts to infringe is important in the
patent context, it is seemingly irrelevant in the copyright context.
164. This similarity has not gone unnoticed by commentators. See Holbrook, supra note
5, at 410 (pointing out that both willfulness and inducement “are trying to answer the same
question: is this party one who is morally culpable in some way?”).
165. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
166. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
167. See id. (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.”).
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authorizing statute, but courts have long trebled damages when an infringer
“willfully” infringes a patent.168 The aim of this doctrine is to deter and
punish those who knowingly infringe a patent, and thus at its core it
requires fault above and beyond mere infringement.169 Consequently,
willful infringement can be succinctly stated as “infringement plus fault,”
with the majority of the discussion revolving around what constitutes fault
for infringement.
1.

Pre-Federal Circuit willfulness: intentional and deliberate
infringement
In its early incarnations, patent infringement did not require any culpable
state of mind for multiplying actual damages—it simply mandated damages
up to three times the patentee’s actual damages for all infringements.170
The 1836 Patent Act eliminated this mandatory triple damages provision,
instead granting courts the discretion to increase damages up to three
times.171 Subsequent amendments to statutory patent law, including the
1952 Patent Act, maintained this system: judges were granted discretion to
increase damages without any explicit guidance.172
Although ultimate discretion as to whether to treble the damages award
rested in the district court,173 which was rarely if ever overturned,174 by the

168. See HARMON, supra note 88, at 1082–83 (noting that willful infringement is a
necessary condition for enhanced infringement damages). Although § 284 does not restrict
increased damages to only situations in which the infringer acted willfully, that is currently
the only basis for enhancement of damages. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing &
Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991). There
are, however, some dissenting voices on the court. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d
1360, 1376–77, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Gajarasa, J.,
concurring) (“I write separately to express my belief that the court should take the
opportunity to eliminate the grafting of willfulness onto section 284.”).
169. Although the precise definition of “willfully” is debatable, its general effect is clear
enough in the patent context for present purposes. No other mental state word has caused so
much controversy—indeed, the authors of the Model Penal Code expressly declined to
include it as part of its framework. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02
cmt. 10 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (“The term ‘wil[l]fully’ was not used
in the drafting of offenses prescribed by the Code . . . .”). Further, Judge Learned Hand once
described it as “dreadful,” “awful,” and “one of the most troublesome words in a statute that
I know.” Id. at n. 47. In the context of patent law, however, it has come to represent the
concept of infringement with some level of fault, and so the more fruitful discussion is over
the degree of fault required, as opposed to the abstract meaning of the term.
170. Powers & Carlson, supra note 75, at 62.
171. Id. at 66.
172. Id.; see generally id. at 67–68 (summarizing the statutory history of treble damages
in patent law).
173. Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. City of Syracuse, 45 F.2d 693, 695, 8 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
80, 82 (2d Cir. 1930).
174. See Overman Cushion Tire Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 66 F.2d 361, 362,
18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1933) (noting that the discretion of the lower court
with respect to increased damages will not be reversed on appeal unless the facts clearly
demonstrate that there was no warrant for the increased damages).
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1960’s an articulated doctrine of willful infringement emerged.175 This
doctrine focused on the concept of the willful infringer as one who
infringed or continued to infringe despite knowing that the conduct
infringed a patent. For example, in General Electric Co. v. Sciaky Bros.,
Inc.,176 the welding department of the defendant, General Electric, was
tasked with developing a system superior to the patentee’s invention.177
When it failed to do so, it copied the patentee’s system outright, despite
having information that it was patented.178 Even General Electric’s patent
department was aware of the infringement, yet the company proceeded
nonetheless.179 In these circumstances, an opinion of counsel concluding
that the patents were invalid was insufficient to defeat the court’s
conclusion that General Electric willfully infringed the patents.180
At the heart of willful infringement was the concept of a defendant who
engaged in infringing conduct despite knowing that in doing so it was
infringing a valid patent.181 If a defendant did not know that its conduct
infringed, or had a good faith belief that the patent was invalid, it lacked
the requisite mens rea and could not willfully infringe. 182 The most
common way to establish this knowledge was by showing that the
defendant copied the patentee’s product. In the pre-Federal Circuit case
Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc.,183 for
example, the Tenth Circuit concluded that UBC’s copying of the patent
holder’s product evidenced that its infringement was willful and “belie[d]
its contention that it proceeded to manufacture and sell modems with a
good-faith belief that there was no infringement.”184 This copying,
175. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 673, 127
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 3, 19 (7th Cir. 1960) (noting the well-established rule that exemplary
damages may be awarded for a conscious and willful infringement); Russell Box Co. v.
Grant Paper Box Co., 203 F.2d 177, 183, 97 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1953) (holding
that the infringer’s carelessness in ascertaining the facts constituted adequate justification
for increasing damages).
176. 415 F.2d 1068, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (6th Cir. 1969).
177. Id. at 1071, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 259.
178. Id. at 1071–72, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 259–60.
179. Id., 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 259–60.
180. Id. at 1072–73, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 260–61.
181. General Electric provides a clear example of this type of infringer. Id. at 1071–74,
163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 259–61; see also Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending
Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1090–91 (“To be willful, an
accused infringer must understand that the patent is valid and that what it is doing infringes
the patent.”).
182. See Cont’l Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 362 F.2d 123, 129, 150
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1966) (quoting Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d
1, 5, 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 309 (7th Cir. 1953)) (“It has been held that a bona fide and
reasonable belief that a patent was invalid removes the infringement from the class
designated as wanton and wilful.”).
183. 623 F.2d 645, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (10th Cir. 1980).
184. Id. at 666, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 497. The court further stated that “[m]any courts
have held that faithful copying of a patented product shows an intentional disregard for the
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combined with knowledge of the patent holder’s rights, provided the
necessary state of mind for willful infringement.185
2.

The Federal Circuit transforms willful infringement into an objective
inquiry
At some point the Federal Circuit changed willful infringement from a
subjective mens rea-driven inquiry into an objective inquiry. This
transition may have occurred in or shortly after 1983, with Underwater
Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.186 Alternatively, as discussed
below, the relevant caselaw supports the reading that even after
Underwater Devices, the court continued to use a mens rea-like inquiry that
only changed to an objective standard much more recently. The significant
point, however, is that regardless of which reading is correct, both require
the conclusion that willful infringement is no longer a mens rea inquiry.
There is a widespread view that shortly after the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the court adopted a negligence standard for willful infringement.
Typical willful infringement cases involved a company manufacturing or
continuing to manufacture a product after being notified by a patent holder
of the infringement.187 In many cases, defendants obtained an opinion of
counsel to determine if their actions were in fact infringing a patent, a
precaution courts have commended as the prudent thing to do.188 In Milgo,
for instance, the court stated that “[o]nce [an accused infringer] had actual
notice of [the patent holder’s] patent rights, [the accused infringer] was
under an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not
it was infringing [the] patents.”189
The Federal Circuit adopted this formulation shortly after its creation. In
Underwater Devices, the patents covered a method and apparatus for laying
pipes underwater. 190 When companies bid on undersea pipeline projects,
Underwater Devices would write to the company to notify it that
Underwater Devices owned the patents and would license the use of the
patented method and apparatus.191 M-K, the successful bidder on an
underwater sewer project, received the license letter but declined to seek a
patent owner’s rights and supports an award of increased damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.”
Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 498.
185. Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 498.
186. 717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
187. In one extreme (for the time) example, the defendant copied the patentee’s modem
before a patent issued, then continued to produce the copied product after it learned that a
patent had issued. Milgo, 623 F.2d at 666, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 497–98.
188. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 660, 127
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 3, 8 (7th Cir. 1960) (noting that the opinion of counsel can be evidence of
good faith).
189. Milgo, 623 F.2d at 666, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 497.
190. Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d at 1382, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 570.
191. Id. at 1384, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 572.
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license.192 In connection with that decision, its in-house attorney prepared
a brief memorandum that the court described as “inadequate,” and which
M-K knew or should have known was not competent legal advice.193
The court concluded that these circumstances supported a finding of
willful infringement, incorporating the Tenth Circuit’s articulation in
Milgo:
Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent
rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing . . . [s]uch an affirmative duty includes,
inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from
counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.194

Subsequent decisions focused heavily on whether the duty of care was
satisfied under various circumstances, such as when a party failed to obtain
(or refused to disclose) an opinion of counsel after learning about the
relevant patent.195
Given the Federal Circuit’s numerous opinions dealing with the duty of
care, it is perhaps unsurprising that the common view of Underwater
Devices and its progeny is to perceive them as constituting an overall shift
to a negligence standard—or even greater, an affirmative duty requirement
that imposed automatic liability for failure to comply—for establishing
willful infringement.196 But this view ignores the fundamental requirement
in the court’s willfulness doctrine: whether the accused infringer possessed
actual knowledge that its conduct infringed a patent. Only once the
accused possessed this mental state did the requirement to exercise due care
apply. In other words, the threshold question—before even getting to the
“duty to investigate” analysis—remained a mens rea inquiry.
Thus, although the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in In re
Seagate Technology, LLC,197 which redefined willful patent infringement,
is widely seen as a shift upwards from negligence to recklessness (thus
raising the fault requirement for willful infringement), I suggest that it is, in
192. Id. at 1385, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 572.
193. Id. at 1390, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576–77.
194. Id. at 1389–90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576.
195. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1327–28 (stating that “[w]hen a
person becomes aware that a patent may have relevance to his or her activities, that person
has a duty to exercise due care and to investigate whether or not his or her activities or
proposed activities infringe any valid, enforceable claim of the patent.”)
196. This shift was especially problematic when combined with the “negative inference
rule,” which allowed finders of fact to infer that the alleged infringer either did not obtain an
opinion of counsel or obtained an unfavorable opinion when it asserted the attorney-client
privilege and declined to state whether it had obtained the advice of counsel. See KnorrBremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344–45, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560, 1565–66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that the attorney-client
relationship could be distorted if the court infers that withheld opinions of counsel relating
to patents are adverse in nature).
197. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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fact, a shift downwards from a subjective view of fault toward an objective
view, and thus implicates a lower threshold of fault than previously existed.
In Seagate, the Federal Circuit repudiated the argument that willful
infringement could be found under a negligence standard and instead
concluded that the appropriate standard was one of recklessness.198
Although it recognized the ambiguity in the term “reckless”, the court
relied on civil law in reasoning that establishing willful infringement
requires a showing that the infringer acted despite knowing of an
“objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent.”199 In eliminating the “duty of care” requirement, however,
the court also eliminated the “knowledge” requirement, thus transforming
the overall inquiry into a wholly objective analysis.200
The critical point, however, is that although on the surface willfulness
appears to be the quintessential mens rea inquiry, it has become anything
but. As I suggest in the next two sections, the use of an objective inquiry in
determining fault makes perfect sense in the context of willful infringement
and is an approach that should be applied to indirect infringement as well.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH VIEWING FAULT AS A MENS REA INQUIRY
IN THE CONTEXT OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT
To this point, I have described the conventional view of the fault
elements of inducement and contributory infringement as involving a state
of mind inquiry into whether the accused party knew that the relevant
conduct infringed a patent or intended for such an infringement. I have
also suggested that although willful infringement was originally treated as
involving a similar subjective inquiry, it has since evolved into a doctrine
utilizing an objective approach to fault.
With this background, I next suggest that this shift from subjective to
198. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
199. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
200. One counterargument to this interpretation of the Underwater Devices-Seagate shift
is the point that post-Seagate district courts have been less willing to find willful
infringement. See Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced
Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study 26 (Conference Paper, Samsung-Stanford
Conference
on
Patent
Remedies)
(Feb.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Christopher%20B.%20
Seaman%20-%20Willful%20Patent%20Infringement%20and%20Enhanced%20Damages
%20After%20In%20re%20Seagate.pdf (finding that, prior to Seagate, district court judges
found willfulness in approximately 53% of bench trials versus 18% after Seagate). If
Seagate represented a shift downwards, one would expect the opposite. However, there are
two primary weaknesses in this counterargument. First, the application of the Federal
Circuit’s “objective recklessness” test by subsequent panels has resulted in an extremely
high standard that is nearly impossible to overcome and which is divorced from traditional
concepts of recklessness. See infra Part V.C. Second, this information may in part reflect
the widespread (and arguably erroneous) perception (evident in Seagate itself) that it
represented a higher fault requirement than previously existed.
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objective is the correct move, as the conventional view of fault for patent
infringement suffers from a series of serious problems that are in large part
related to the doctrine’s origins as an adaptation of the tort theory of aiding
and abetting. At the same time, simply converting the analysis to an
objective one is not the answer. Rather, because of the differences between
general tort theories and patent law, a more narrowly tailored articulation
of fault is necessary.
A. Mens Rea Does Not Work When Applied to Corporations
The first problem with attempting to use mental state concepts in the
context of patent infringement is the difficulty—and perhaps
impossibility—associated with ascertaining the mental state of a
corporation. Commentators have long recognized the challenges involved
in determining a corporation’s subjective state of mind.201 Indeed, the
notion of corporate mens rea is the subject of its own line of scholarly
debate and controversies.202 Given the difficulty in assessing the “mind” of
a corporation, it is unsurprising that civil law has been reluctant to tread
this path.203
The same is true in patent law—one could tie oneself in knots attempting
to determine whether a company subjectively desired to infringe a patent,
or knew to a certainty that its conduct did so. Assessing the corporate mind
is particularly problematic when dealing with the interface between highly
technical questions and complex (often unsettled) legal problems. For
example, consider a company that manufactures telecommunications
equipment. The company likely employs an engineer who knows every
nuanced detail of a particular component of a piece of cell phone RS-52,
such as the fact that the transmission signal encoding software uses a fivebit random sequence at the start of each message. The company also likely
employs a product manager who generally knows how cell phone RS-52
works, but does not know the details of each individual component. There
is also a set of senior management, as well as a legal department that knows
201. See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 822–23 (noting the difficulty of determining the
mental state of an organization compared to an individual because organizations generally
have several individuals with different thoughts, perceptions, and levels of responsibility);
see also V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 359 (1999) (concluding that corporate mens rea
standards are generally undesirable and should be replaced with either strict liability or
negligence).
202. Khanna, supra note 201, at 356 n.1.
203. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 213 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“Since, however, [mental culpability] is almost never
admitted, and can be proven only by the conduct and the circumstances, an objective
standard must of necessity in practice be applied.”). Although Dobbs refers to individuals,
the point is even more applicable to corporations, whose nature is such that it is even more
difficult to look beyond their conduct and the circumstances.
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vaguely how the company’s products work, and possesses legal knowledge
about patent law including the ability to interpret a given claim term, but
has no idea that there is a random sequence at the start of each message, let
alone that it consists of five bits. Wherein lies the “mind” of the company
for purposes of ascertaining infringement? Is it in the engineer, who knows
how the relevant product works, but lacks the legal ability to interpret the
claims of a patent or the substantive knowledge of patent law? Or is it in
the legal department, which can interpret the claims of a patent, but lacks
even an inkling that the company’s product uses a five-bit random
sequence at the start of messages? Or is it the senior management, which
lacks information about either? Yet, this is just one of the inquiries
associated with determining whether given conduct infringes a patent—the
patent must also be valid and enforceable.204 To apply a subjective inquiry
to this question involves probing the mind of an amorphous, fictional
creation to ascertain whether it knows the answer to complicated technolegal questions.
B. A Subjective Standard Fails to Deter Undesirable Conduct
Another problem with the subjective view of fault in indirect
infringement is the inability to arrive at an optimal level of deterrence
under such a standard.
Indirect infringement doctrines exist because, in some cases, suing the
direct infringer is essentially impossible, and is economically inefficient.205
Under such circumstances, therefore, the law prefers that patent holders sue
an alternate party associated with the infringement, one that is in a better
position to prevent or avoid infringement. Indirect infringement, therefore,
provides a deterrence mechanism for patent infringement: the existence of
the doctrine encourages companies to avoid engaging in conduct that aids
others in infringing a patent.
One way to visualize the effects of a deterrence rationale is to consider
what level of precautions against patent infringement the law should
encourage parties to take.206 Some commentators suggest that the best way
to accomplish this deterrence function would be to eliminate the fault
element altogether.207 Thus, if indirect infringement were a strict liability
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (recognizing defenses of invalidity and unenforceability
as defenses to infringement).
205. See supra Part II.
206. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 587–88 (2009)
(noting that most companies advise their employees not to read outside patents to avoid the
risk of acquiring knowledge about relevant patents).
207. See, e.g., Oswald, supra note 5, at 244 (arguing that the Patent Act suggests that the
risk of loss should fall on the infringer); Rader, supra note 5, at 315–16 (criticizing a
Federal Circuit decision holding that the intent prong for inducement requires the plaintiff to
show that the alleged inducer knowingly induced infringement); Sichelman, supra note 5, at
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claim, parties would be forced to take maximum precautions to avoid
causing or assisting others in engaging in infringing acts. But society
would generally prefer firms to invest in actual productive activities, as
opposed to unnecessary precautions, especially here, where the costs of
determining whether particular conduct infringes are not lower for the
potential infringer than the patent holder.208 In short, allowing strict
liability—or even negligence—for indirect infringement claims would
result in inefficient over-deterrence.209
Yet just as a low fault threshold would result in over-deterrence, so too
does too high of a threshold under-deter patent infringement. By requiring
actual knowledge for indirect infringement, parties would be disinclined to
take any steps to learn whether they actually infringe a patent. While
burying one’s head in the sand upon becoming aware of a high probability
of infringement might not be an optimal strategy under Global-Tech, given
its willful blindness language,210 provided that one never begins inquiring
into whether particular conduct infringed a patent, one might never need to
take any precautions against causing infringement of a patent.211 In
essence, a fault standard of knowledge or intent places all the burden of
risk of injury from induced patent infringement onto the shoulders of the
patentee, despite the potential for the inducer to be in a better position to
analyze whether its conduct infringes a patent.212 Requiring purpose or
54 (concluding that requiring knowledge of the patent for a finding of inducement is
contrary to law and bad policy). Although not directly contending that the fault element
should be eliminated, these commentators argue that inducement should require only
knowledge of or intent to produce the infringing acts, as opposed to knowledge that the acts
infringed. This would effectively result in a strict liability standard for inducement of
infringement, at least with respect to the requirement of fault relating to infringement. But
see Holbrook, supra note 5, at 409–11 (arguing that a narrower intent standard would not
significantly reduce the value of patents and that a strict liability standard fails to consider
the potential anti-competitive consequences of affording to patent owners such a powerful
tool).
208. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and
Attorney’s Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 291, 314 (2004–2005)
(arguing that, with respect to punitive damages, the exclusive goal of the patent system is a
utilitarian one, namely to stimulate invention, disclosure, and other related activities).
Although Professor Cotter’s analysis was performed in the context of the pre-Seagate duty
to obtain an opinion of counsel, and his conclusions are directed to that issue, his discussion
of under-deterrence and over-deterrence is nevertheless relevant to the fault element of
inducement. See id. at 315–26 (analyzing the risk of over-deterrence and the scenarios in
which there would be a risk of under-detection or under-enforcement).
209. One might also question whether such a standard would result in any effective
deterrence at all. There is a human tendency to ignore even grave risks that are unavoidable,
effectively putting on blinders to the existence of the risk.
210. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011).
211. This is not to say that potential infringers would always want to avoid learning of
infringement. In order to avoid costs associated with future findings of infringement, parties
might choose to conduct an investigation so as to avoid problems that might arise from such
a finding, such as opportunity costs and loss of startup investments.
212. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 244–45 (describing the allocation of risk in the context
of opinion letters).
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virtual certainty for inducement ensures that firms will take no precautions
against the possibility of causing another to infringe.
C. Mental State Concepts in Tort Law Are Not Directly Applicable to
Patent Infringement
While the preceding two points suggest that a subjective approach to
fault may be ill-fitting, they are likely insufficient to conclusively
demonstrate that an objective approach is preferable. Towering above
them, however, is the fundamental problem that viewing indirect
infringement as an intentional tort, complete with mental state inquiry, just
does not work.
As previously discussed, subjective mental states can be divided into two
principal categories: purpose and knowledge.213 But neither of these two
types of mental states—nor the more general notion of “intent”—provides
a logical inquiry in the context of patent infringement.
1.

Nobody possesses the purpose of infringing a patent
Take the first possibility, the one suggested by the case law: that
inducement requires that the accused party possess the purpose of
infringing a patent214 or, in the narrowest sense of the term, intend to
infringe a patent.215 This inquiry posits the seemingly innocuous question
of whether the accused infringer consciously desired to bring about an
infringement.
But such a mental state requirement is nonsensical. No one sets out with
the goal of infringing a patent. A firm may purposefully encourage, desire,
and assist another person in practicing a particular method. A company
may even act with the purpose of copying another company’s product or
method. But none of these acts constitute purpose to infringe. For
example, a company that copies a competitor’s technology is not more
likely to do so if that technology is protected by a patent; indeed, one
would expect the converse to be closer to reality. Asking whether one
possesses the purpose to infringe is tantamount to asking whether one
213. Although subjective recklessness is also a form of subjective fault, the fault
elements of inducement and contributory infringement are virtually always described in
terms of intent, purpose or knowledge, and not in terms of subjective recklessness. Indeed,
subjective recklessness may be a viable approach to fault.
214. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) (granting
certiorari to determine whether the legal standard for inducement is deliberate indifference
of a known risk that infringement may occur or purposeful, culpable expression and conduct
to
encourage
an
infringement),
question
presented
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/10-00006qp.pdf.
215. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238,
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Accordingly, inducement requires evidence of culpable conduct,
directed to encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge
of the direct infringer’s activities.”).
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possesses the purpose of violating the law: it is not the right question to
ask.216
Of course, there might be exceptions to the assertion that no one’s
purpose is to infringe a patent. An example would be that of an individual
who seeks to demonstrate that patents are evil, and thus intentionally
creates an infringing device in an effort to become a martyr for the cause.
Such a mental state could also be akin to that of the Gingerbread Man, who
derives pleasure from taunting his pursuers. Yet both these examples are
fundamentally absurd, and limiting inducement to this context would
essentially vitiate the doctrine.
Another exception might be in the pharmaceutical context, where the law
incentivizes generics companies to copy products that are protected by
patents.217
But even in this context, the generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer’s purpose is not to infringe a patent; indeed, it will only reap
a benefit once a court determines either that the company’s product does
not infringe the patent or the patent is invalid.218 Thus it, too, lacks the
purpose of infringement.
2.

Knowledge and the requirement of substantial certainty
Despite “purpose” making little sense in the context of patent
infringement, perhaps the alternate intent standard of “knowledge” is the
correct one. In Restatement of Torts terms, determining whether an
accused party possesses “knowledge,” in the context of determining intent,
asks whether the party “believes that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from [the party’s acts or lack thereof].”219 Thus, a
“knowing” state of mind occurs when one believes that a given outcome is
substantially or virtually certain,220 not merely probable or even highly
likely. Consider the following example from the Restatement (Third) of
216. In connection with this argument, it is important to keep in mind the distinction
between intending that a third party engage in particular acts and intending that those acts
infringe. No one, including myself, seems to dispute that the former is required. It is the
latter part of the inquiry that is illogical when viewed from the standpoint of purpose.
217. If a generic pharmaceutical company copies an innovator company’s drug product
that is protected by a patent, the generic company can be entitled to 180 days of exclusivity
against subsequent generic drug developers. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., Ltd., 620
F.3d 1341, 1343, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers are encouraged to copy technology specifically because it is
patented. Provided that the generic manufacturer prevails in the subsequent patent
litigation, it will be better off against its generic competitors.
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006) (delaying approval for new drug
application until a finding of non-infringement or invalidity or until 30 months have passed
from the date of giving notice under § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); see Simons, supra note 51, at 1063
(explaining that an intent to produce a consequence can mean either the purpose to produce
that consequence or the knowledge that the consequence is substantially certain to result);
see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
220. These two terms are functionally interchangeable. See supra note 56.
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Torts:
When Steve, a policeman, seeks to pull to the side of the road a car that
has made an illegal turn, the car speeds away. Steve undertakes a chase,
and continues the chase even though the car is making every effort to
escape, driving rapidly and somewhat wildly. Steve is well aware there
is a significant likelihood that someone will suffer physical harm, either
personal injury or at least property damage, in the course of the chase. In
fact, the escaping car strikes the car owned by Ruth, which she is driving
carefully on the highway. Steve, in initiating and continuing the chase,
has not intentionally harmed Ruth or her car. Steve did not harbor a
purpose that Ruth (or anyone else) suffer any harm; while Steve knew
there was a significant likelihood of such harm, the harm was not
substantially certain to occur.221

As with purpose, however, the infringer who would meet a knowledge
standard short of a final judgment is rare. In patent law, the consequences
of illegal conduct are that the conduct infringes a patent. When applied in
the patent context, therefore, the “knowing” inquiry asks whether the
accused party believes that infringement of a patent is virtually certain to
result from the relevant acts.
But the only way to actually know that conduct infringes a patent is to
interpret the claims and conduct in an infringement analysis. Even then,
one cannot be “practically certain” that conduct infringes a patent—the
only way to know for sure is to have a court make a final determination. In
addition, limiting the standard to this extent would make it easy for
defendants to escape liability. For instance, a potential defendant could
prepare an infringement analysis that indicates it does not infringe—
including erroneous conclusions, if necessary—to obtain evidence that it
was not substantially certain that the conduct infringed a patent.
Furthermore, because one cannot be “substantially certain” that conduct
infringes a patent without conducting an infringement analysis, as long as
one avoids doing so, one could not be proven to possess the requisite
mental state. At best, a potential infringer can be aware of a high risk of
infringement, but knowledge of a high risk is not certainty.
Global-Tech provides a clear illustration of this incongruence. In its
preliminary analysis, the Court likens inducement of infringement to a used
car salesman who induces a customer to purchase a damaged car.222 The
Court draws a comparison to a salesman who knows that the car is
damaged from one who does not to distinguish inducement of infringement
with and without fault.223 But it is one thing to know that a car is damaged;
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 cmt. c, illus. 4
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
222. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
223. Of course, as discussed throughout this Article, the Court does not describe its
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it is a wholly different inquiry to “know” that a patent is infringed.
Perhaps, however, Global-Tech’s adoption of willful blindness as a form
of knowledge offers an escape route from the constraints of “knowledge”
as a standard. To this I offer three responses. First, willful blindness is a
doctrine whose role and boundaries have been heavily criticized by
scholars in the criminal law context in which it was previously applied.224
In particular, scholars have questioned the ability of jurors to interpret this
context and distinguish it from negligence.225
Setting aside concerns over the doctrine itself, it is questionable how
fully it departs from the certainty required by a pure knowledge standard.
As the Court noted in Global-Tech, a willfully blind defendant is one “who
can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.”226 Knowledge
of a “high probability” may be enough, although conventionally the
threshold required for knowledge is a very high probability indeed.227
Thus, to the extent “willful blindness” involves a probability akin to that
traditionally required for knowledge in the civil context, viz., substantial
certainty, the criticisms discussed in this Part and the next are equally
applicable.
On the other hand, there is reason to at least suspect that the “high
analysis in terms of fault, but rather as a question of knowledge. Id.
224. Numerous scholars in the criminal law sphere have criticized the concept of willful
blindness, which commentators frequently use interchangeably with “deliberate ignorance.”
See Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness,
102 YALE L.J. 2231, 2231 n.1 (1993) (citing several phrases that commentators use
interchangeably with willful blindness, including “deliberate ignorance”); see, e.g., Alan C.
Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 91–92 (2000) (criticizing the proliferation of the willful blindness
doctrine as promoting vague standards that “have allowed arbitrary and inappropriate
judgments.”); Robin Charlow, Willful Ignorance and Criminal Culpablity, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1351, 1354–57 (1992); see also id. at 1359–66 (discussing the many different interpretations
of the concept of “willful blindness”). Commentators are particularly skeptical of the ability
of jurors to properly apply a “willful blindness” instruction.
225. Commentators are particularly skeptical of the ability of jurors to properly apply a
“willful blindness” instruction. See Marcus, supra note 224, at 2248 (“[A] jury may indeed
interpret deliberate ignorance to mean that the defendant may be convicted because she
should have known the fact—i.e., a negligence standard”); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich
Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
191, 226–31 (1990) (providing similar analysis).
226. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011).
227. See supra Part I.B. Note that the Model Penal Code allows for knowledge of a
particular fact to be established through an awareness of a “high probability of its existence,
unless [the accused] actually believes that it does not exist.” MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(7)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). This does not eliminate the high threshold for knowledge;
rather, it creates a rebuttable presumption of knowledge upon demonstration of an
awareness of the “high probability.” Furthermore, it is questionable how applicable this
criminal law concept is to the civil context, as the Restatement (Second) or (Third) of Torts
does not contain a “high probability” exception, and relies on the concept of substantial
certainty. In any event, as discussed below, the incorporation of a probabilistic assessment
into the fault inquiry essentially implicates the concept of recklessness. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
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probability” that the court had in mind is significantly lower than
substantial certainty, given the facts before it,228 and its use of the “high
probability” language as opposed to that of virtual or substantial certainty.
If that is the case, the Court has essentially adopted a subjective
recklessness standard for knowledge despite its explicit assertion to the
contrary229 and many of the benefits of a risk-based approach discussed in
this article will perhaps be realized.230
3. Why “purpose” and “knowledge” don’t work in the context of patent
infringement
The goal of the preceding two sections was to demonstrate that neither
purpose nor knowledge is a viable expression of fault in the context of
inducement or contributory infringement. Yet why is this so? The reason
flows from a fundamental difference between tort law and patent law:
mens rea principles in tort law focus on the actor’s mental state with
respect to the factual consequences of given conduct, while patent law
focuses on the legal consequences of that conduct. Linked to this
distinction is the predictable nature of many factual consequences—a
nature that is quite unlike that of patent infringement.
As previously discussed, both the original conception of the fault
elements for contributory infringement and inducement, as well as the
Federal Circuit’s articulations of those elements, are based on intentional
tort mental state concepts. In tort, however, the mental state inquiry largely
focuses on whether the actor desired or was aware of the factual
consequences flowing from his actions, not whether those actions are

228. See infra Part III.D.
229. See Global-Tech 131 S. Ct. at 2063. See infra Part IV for a comparison of the
Supreme Court’s articulation of “willful blindness” (“First, the defendant must subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists. Second, the defendant must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Id.) with the view of objective
recklessness discussed in this Article, which asks whether “a high risk of infringing a valid
patent would have been obvious to a person in the accused party’s position.”
230. The “deliberate indifference” standard applied by the Federal Circuit in SEB S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1376–77, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617, 1628 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060
(2011), suffers from a similar flaw. If, on the one hand, it is treated like a form of
“knowledge,” as the panel suggested in SEB, id. at 1377, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628, it
essentially asks whether the defendant deliberately disregarded a substantial certainty that it
infringed a patent, thus encountering all the problems inherent in the above discussion. If,
on the other hand, it is considered a form of subjective recklessness (as the case cited by the
panel, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994), suggests), it is effectively a form of
the risk-based analysis proposed in this Article. The exception is that subjective
recklessness still includes a state of mind component, in the form of the defendant’s
awareness of the risk, thus rendering it subject to the problem of having to discern the
corporate mind. Yet, despite this flaw, it is preferable to continuing to pretend to apply a
knowledge standard. Nevertheless, rather than calling the analysis “deliberate indifference,”
I suggest that it be called what it is: subjective recklessness.
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actually against the law.231
Thus, a rough who beats up an innocent passer-by is liable for civil
battery because she knows that she is engaging in undesired contact,
regardless of her awareness that she can be sued for doing so.232 Even the
tort of inducement of tortious conduct, although it requires knowledge that
the conduct is wrongful, does not require knowledge that the conduct
constitutes a specific tort.233 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that
“one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces the conduct, if he
knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct
tortious if it were his own.”234 Although the comments are silent as to
whether this means knowledge of the wrong that will result or knowledge
that the wrong is a tort, only the former requirement is consistent with
traditional principles of tort law. For example, the sections of the
Restatement (Second) and (Third) of Torts dealing with intent discuss only
knowledge of the consequences, not knowledge that the conduct is
tortious.235 Likewise, a company who instructs another to repossess goods
from one who has a right of ownership (the tort of conversion) can be liable
for inducement of tortious conduct, regardless of whether it knows that
doing so constitutes conversion.236 In short, it is a basic principle of mens
rea that a person who engages in conduct constituting a tort does not escape
liability by claiming that he did not believe his conduct violated a specific
law or constituted a certain tort.237
231. This principle is equally true in criminal law: “Neither knowledge nor recklessness
or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or
application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense,
unless the definition of the offense or the Code so provides.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 2.02(9) (1995). But see id. cmt. 11 (discussing when there may be special
circumstances where knowledge of the law defining the offense is part of the culpability
requirement). Thus, a perpetrator who sets fire to a building is guilty of the crime of arson
because he intended to destroy a building, not because he intended to commit the crime of
arson. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 (1995).
232. “An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause
a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other
directly or indirectly results.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). “Intending”
merely means to cause either bodily harm or apprehension of such harm, as opposed to
intending to cause the tort of battery. See id. cmt. c (explaining that whether the actor is
inspired by any personal hostility toward the other, or whether he acts as a practical joke, is
immaterial to the meaning of intent).
233. See Adams, supra note 5, at 642–43 (“[W]hile section 877(a) [of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts] requires a specific intent to induce tortious conduct, it requires only
constructive knowledge that the tortfeasor’s conduct is tortious.”).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
236. Cf. Zimprich v. North Dakota Harvestore Sys., Inc., 461 N.W.2d 425, 427–28 (N.D.
1990) (discussing only the awareness of the property interest of another as opposed to
knowledge that the conduct constitutes the tort of conversion).
237. This principle is particularly clear in the criminal context. See TORCIA, supra note
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Patent law is different. Absent a patent, there is nothing unlawful, or
even “bad,” about making and selling a particular product. To the contrary,
under most circumstances, making and selling a product is desirable
behavior.238 It is only when the additional element of a patent is introduced
that the behavior becomes unlawful.
Because fault in patent infringement relates to whether particular
conduct infringes a specific patent, a question that is absent from tort law,
conventional tort rationales for a given standard are not necessarily
applicable. To draw an analogy, it would be as though the tort of battery
required not just knowledge that jumping on a person’s back will result in
an undesired contact, but also a lawyer’s appreciation that doing so satisfies
the elements of the tort of battery.239 As a result, traditional tort principles
of mens rea do not apply to patent law because tort expressions of mens rea
standards are focused on whether the accused desires or is aware of the
physical consequences of her acts—physical consequences that can be
highly predictable—while the consequences in patent law turn on an
appreciation of a legal issue that is almost never completely predictable,
namely, whether the conduct infringes a patent.
The closest parallel to inducement of infringement is perhaps the tort of
intentional interference with contract. But even that tort provides little aid
in fashioning a test for the patent law context. Intentional interference
arises when one “[i]ntentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract.”240 But what does it mean to “intentionally”
interfere with the performance of a contract—is it necessary to intend to
engage in the acts that interfere with the contract, or is it necessary to
intend to interfere with the contract itself? There is a consensus that the
latter requires at least negligence, but exactly how much fault is required is
subject to debate.241
For example, Richard Epstein views the concept of intentional
interference with contract as a manifestation of the problem of ostensible
ownership, which arises when a party who is placed in possession of
30, at 566 (“[A] person who engages in conduct constituting a crime will not be heard to
claim that he did not believe his conduct was criminal. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat—
ignorance of law excuses no one.”).
238. Of course, there are circumstances under which making and selling a product might
be considered undesirable. A manufacturer and distributor of illegal fireworks, for example,
might be an exception. Outside of otherwise illegal conduct, however, society tends to
value labor and production.
239. Such knowledge is, of course, not required. See, e.g., Lambertson v. United States,
528 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir. 1976) (articulating that the essential element to establish battery
is the intent to cause contact, not to cause injury).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979); DIAMOND, supra note 40, at 338.
241. See DIAMOND, supra note 40, at 339–40 (noting that knowledge of the valid
contract is required, but may turn on whether the accused “should have known” of the
contract).
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another’s property acts as its owner in dealing with a third party.242 When
the third party has notice that the ostensible owner is not the true owner, he
is treated as a purchaser in bad faith.243 Likewise, a plaintiff only has an
action for inducement of breach of contract against one who knows about
the contract.244 Viewed through this lens, the basis for requiring notice is
readily apparent: a negligence requirement for inducement of breach of
contract is too costly and uncertain to be of much good, and an innocent
third party’s position is no better than that of the prior contracting party.245
But add in the element of notice of the contract, and the third party
becomes akin to a bad faith purchaser of goods.246 Yet, although this view
helps demonstrate that torts involving inducement of a violation of a legal
construct should require a greater degree of fault than mere negligence, it
does not indicate how much greater that degree should be—does
recklessness suffice, for example, or is actual knowledge or purpose
required? Furthermore, “knowledge” in the context of a contract, or
ownership of physical property, is arguably much clearer than “knowledge”
in the context of a patent. Distilled to its essence, then, attempting to draw
upon ideas of intentional interference with contract would require us to
import concepts that are themselves not the product of agreement and may
involve consequences that are much more predictable than in the patent
context. Nor do they help solve the overarching problems discussed above.
Ultimately, the fundamental problem with applying traditional tort
concepts of intent, purpose or knowledge to the patent infringement context
is that those concepts primarily focus on the factual consequences of a
certain conduct, as opposed to the legal consequences. Furthermore, they
typically involve factual consequences that are highly predictable: if A
swings her fist at B, A can be substantially certain that she will strike B.
But in patent law, the legal consequences of infringement are plainly
undesirable, and the predictability of infringement is rarely so certain as it
is in the world of intentional torts.
D. Courts’ Discomfiture with State of Mind Inquiries in the Context of
Patent Infringement
The preceding conceptual arguments are strengthened by the observation
242. Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1987).
243. See id. at 24 (explaining that the third party purchaser gets priority only when she
acts in good faith without notice of the prior contract).
244. See id. at 24–25 (noting that the good faith purchaser is protected from liability
against the original owner).
245. See id. at 25 (arguing that society is generally better off if the innocent inducer of a
breach of contract is not subject to a cause of action from the original promisee).
246. See id. at 24 (“[T]he subsequent taker gets priority only where he acts in good faith,
that is, without notice of the prior contract.”).
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that the jurisprudence reflects the courts’ difficulty in directly applying the
knowledge and purpose standards. These attempts have forced the Federal
Circuit to develop workarounds and, ultimately, to move toward a riskbased standard.
The inducement of infringement jurisprudence reflects the difficulty of
applying a true “knowledge” or “purpose” standard. For example, in Water
Technologies Corp. v. Calco,247 the Federal Circuit concluded that despite a
letter evidencing the accused indirect infringer’s subjective belief that his
composition did not infringe the patent, the objective evidence (such as the
infringer’s lack of an opinion of counsel supporting that belief) supported
the jury’s conclusion that such a belief was objectively unreasonable.248
Because the court articulated the fault inquiry as requiring “knowledge” of
infringement, it was forced to apply the reasoning that intent could be
“inferred from all of the circumstances”—despite those circumstances
involving the objective validity of the accused infringer’s belief, as
opposed to whether he subjectively believed it was true.249
Global-Tech provides another example in which even the Supreme Court
was unable to apply a conventional “knowledge” analysis to the facts
before it.250 The accused infringer in the case, Pentalpha, purchased a SEB
deep fryer in Hong Kong and copied “all but its cosmetic features.”251 It
then hired an attorney to conduct a right-to-use study but did not tell him
that it had based its product on SEB’s product.252 It subsequently sold its
fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them (an act of direct infringement).253
The Supreme Court did not find that Global-Tech possessed knowledge of
infringement; instead, it invoked a criminal law doctrine that had never
before been applied to patent law.254
Courts’ discomfort with a mental state-based view of fault is also
apparent in their treatment of willful infringement, where they struggled
247. 850 F.2d 660, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
248. Id. at 668–69, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
249. Id. at 669, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. The practice of inferring from the
circumstances is common when dealing with subjective questions of intent, and I do not
contend that it is always a bad approach. The problem arises, however, when consequences
are not easily predictable, as I argue is the case when dealing with questions of patent
infringement.
250. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2010).
251. Id. at 2064. It is worth noting that the SEB fryer was not marked with a U.S. patent
number, a fact that the Court found did not excuse Pentalpha’s behavior. Id. at 2071.
(asserting that the company’s CEO was well aware that U.S. patent markings do not
typically appear on products made for sale overseas).
252. Id. at 2064.
253. Id.
254. A search of Westlaw’s CTAF database, which contains the Federal Circuit’s
opinions, for the term “willful blindness” produced only one hit in a case involving patent
law, Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Even
that case did not directly apply the doctrine; rather, it merely mentioned the doctrine in dicta
relating to a licensee’s right to sue. Id. at 1382.
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with a mens rea approach for years before the Federal Circuit decisively
adopted an objective standard. Because courts couldn’t quite make a
mental state requirement work, they developed workarounds. For example,
although many pre-Federal Circuit willful infringement opinions used
“knowledge” as a basis for willful infringement, they typically limited that
knowledge requirement to knowledge of the patent, as opposed to
knowledge that the relevant conduct infringed.255 One possible explanation
of this jurisprudence is that while merely being aware of a patent does not
provide actual knowledge that particular conduct infringes, it nevertheless
creates a high enough degree of risk that courts are comfortable to label the
conduct willful infringement. Another example is that although it was
commonly stated both before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit
that “a bona fide and reasonable belief that a patent was invalid removes
the infringement from the class designated as wanton and wil[l]ful,”256 the
inverse is also true—an unreasonable belief does not preclude a finding of
willful infringement.257 Yet in a pure “knowledge” world, an unreasonable
belief should suffice—it is the accused party’s state of mind that matters,
after all, as opposed to what a reasonable person would think.
IV. AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF FAULT SPECIFIC TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Thus far, I have argued that viewing fault in the traditional mens rea
terms of tort law, as a question of purpose or knowledge, does not work in
the context of patent infringement. But is there a better option? I suggest
that there is, in the form of an objective analysis akin to civil recklessness.
By applying this analysis—which can be precisely tailored to patent law—
the law can move beyond the problematic paradigm of mens rea inquiries.
In my view, the correct way to understand fault in the context of indirect
infringement is to see it as involving an objective inquiry, one that asks
whether a high risk of infringing a valid patent would have been obvious to

255. See, e.g., Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666, 206
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 498 (10th Cir. 1980) (discussing the fact that UBC had copied its
competitor’s product but stating that it was its “subsequent knowledge of the existence of
the patent” that ultimately led to the finding of willfulness); see also Lam, Inc. v. JohnsManville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 475, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1061, 1071 (10th Cir. 1982)
(considering whether the infringer “knew or should have known of the other’s patent
protection”).
256. Cont’l Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 362 F.2d 123, 129, 150 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1966) (quoting Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 1, 5, 99
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 309 (7th Cir. 1953)).
257. See Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211, 215 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that Travenol “had no bona fide belief or any
reasonable basis for a bona fide belief that the Novo patent was invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed”); Lam, 668 F.2d at 475, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1071 (indicating that the
court was “not impressed with the reasons counsel gave” in its “no infringement” opinion
letter).
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a person in the accused party’s position. The greater the risk, the more
likely it is that this fault element will be met; the lower the risk, the less
likely. At one extreme are those who possess substantial certainty that their
conduct will infringe a patent—the rare exception discussed above, such as
the company that continues to engage in acts inducing a third party to
engage in particular behavior despite a final judgment that the third party’s
behavior directly infringes a patent. At the other are those who would have
no reason to suspect that a patent covering the relevant conduct exists.
Two characteristics define this analysis. First, the risk element is actorcentric, in that it is based on facts that the actor either knew of or should
have known.258 This is consistent with the way recklessness is treated in
the tort context. For example, recklessness, when applied to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress,259 includes facts such as the
actor’s knowledge of the victim’s susceptibility to emotional distress.260
Furthermore, the analysis occurs at the time of the act, not at the time of the
litigation.261 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
recklessness as acting or failing to act “knowing or having reason to know
of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also
that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent,”262 while the Restatement (Third) of Torts reaches
the same result by requiring that the risk be one for which a “precaution
that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that are so slight
relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference to the
risk.”263 In both articulations, it is the risk as perceived by a person in the
actor’s place that is relevant, not some abstract notion of risk held by an

258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1965). See also DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 203, at 213–14 (recklessness looks at what “a reasonable person in the actor’s
place” would have been aware of); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 2 (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (stating that a person acts recklessly if they know the
risk of harm created by the conduct or know of facts that make the risk to another person
obvious).
259. Despite the inclusion of “intentional” in its name, intentional infliction of emotional
distress includes reckless infliction of emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965) (stating that knowledge of high risk can result in liability for
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress).
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965).
261. Because patent infringement can be an ongoing tort, one would expect the degree of
risk to be evaluated during the entire period of infringing conduct. Obviously, in some
circumstances the risk from the accused infringer’s point of view might be very low, such as
when it lacks actual or constructive notice of the patent.
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
263. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 2 (Proposed Final
Draft 2005). It bears repeating that knowledge of facts that make the risk obvious to another
in the person’s situation also suffices.

RANTANEN.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1624

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/11/2011 3:13 PM

[Vol. 60:1575

omniscient being.264 For example, consider A, who shoots a gun in the
direction of B knowing that there is a live bullet in only one of the six
chambers.265 That person would be acting in the face of an objectively high
risk, regardless of the knowledge of C, the person who loaded the gun and
placed the bullet in the chamber furthest away from the firing pin, or that of
omniscient being G, who knows that the bullet is not in the firing chamber
before A pulls the trigger. Nor would it matter that, after pulling the
trigger, A learned that the bullet was not in the firing chamber.
Second, this test is tailored to patent infringement. The general tort view
of recklessness is directed primarily at factual consequences and phrases
the analysis in terms of “harm” and the precautions that could be taken to
mitigate that harm.266 But the fundamental question of fault for indirect
infringement relates to a single question: whether the relevant conduct
infringes a patent.267 Furthermore, viewing the issue in terms of potential
precautions is unnecessary. Taking any of the available precautions—such
as changing product design or conducting an investigation into the
infringement risk—will necessarily change the risk calculus.268 The
simpler, and arguably better, approach is to just recognize that the risk
involved in inducement and contributory infringement is the risk of
infringement, and it must be high. This is not an abstract metric. Copying
a patented product, for example, is a high-risk activity.269 Hiring
employees who worked on a competitor’s product might similarly be a
high-risk activity. In contrast, independently developing technology and
verifying through infringement analyses that that technology is unrelated to
any of a competitor’s patents would be a low risk activity.270
264. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 illus. 5
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (indicating that for intentional conduct, it is necessary that the
actor herself possess the knowledge that a harm was substantially certain).
265. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 2 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) (positing that an airline without knowledge that its plane will
crash may satisfy the recklessness standard but not the probability standard).
266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 2 (Proposed Final
Draft 2005).
267. Note that although I have limited harm in this way, it is not the only way to
conceive of the issue. One might instead posit that the concept of risk should not be limited
to just the risk of infringement, but should also encompass the consequences that flow from
that infringement. For example, the “harm” associated with infringing the patent of a nonpracticing entity seems less, on some plane, than the “harm” associated with infringing the
patent of a pharmaceutical company, thereby irrevocably changing the market for the
relevant drug product. I leave this to future discussion, however.
268. Furthermore, part of the risk analysis involves whether or not a reasonable person
would perceive the patent as valid. Although patents are entitled to a presumption of
validity, this is only a presumption. In cases where there were strong factual indicia of
invalidity, a reasonable person might conclude that a low risk of infringement existed
because the patent was likely invalid.
269. See infra Part V.B (discussing the best way to determine risk).
270. One criticism of the recklessness approach to fault for inducement, raised by
Professor Holbrook, is that it does not create a safe harbor for innocent inducers. Letter
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V. APPLYING THE OBJECTIVE VIEW OF FAULT
Given the practical and theoretical basis for dispensing with the mental
state inquiry and reframing the question of fault in terms of objective risk,
the logical next step would be for the courts to explicitly adopt it in the
context of indirect patent infringement.271 In doing so, the problems
associated with the poor fit of the current approach, discussed in Part III,
would be reduced. Such a change would have the added benefit of
allowing courts to hone in on the optimal deterrence level.
A. Fine-Tuning Deterrence Through Risk
As discussed earlier, indirect infringement serves a deterrence function
in that it discourages parties from encouraging infringement. Several
competing policy concerns drive this assessment, which is equally relevant
whether dealing with contributory infringement or inducement.
The first set of concerns relates to over vs. under deterrence of infringing
conduct. On one side of the equation is the concern is that too high of a
fault standard (such as purpose or knowledge) will under-deter potential
infringement because it encourages defendants to construct their behavior
not to avoid causing infringement, but to avoid learning about it. Balanced
against this is the concern that too low of a fault standard would over-deter
innocent conduct. The extreme of this position—that inducement should
require no fault at all with respect to whether conduct infringes a patent—
from Timothy Holbrook, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, to author (on
file with author). Whether or not an inducer is innocent, however, is a matter of perspective.
In my view, a party that engages in conduct that a reasonable person would view as
involving a high risk of patent infringement—copying a competitor’s product that was
marked with patent numbers, for example—should not be entitled to a “safe harbor.”
Indeed, that is precisely the type of conduct that the inducement doctrine should be
deterring.
271. Another criticism that could be leveled against the fault proposal discussed herein is
that it results in inducement rendering the contributory infringement doctrine superfluous.
See Brief for 41 Law, Economics, and Business Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) (No. 10-6),
2010 WL 5069528, at *2–6 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in SEB S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., blurs the functions of the Patent Act). I don’t think it does.
First, even if the fault elements with respect to infringement are identical, contributory
infringement (where applicable) may be easier for the patent holder to establish because it
does not require the patent holder to prove that the defendant intended the component to be
used for the underlying acts—a not-insignificant point, given the outcome of HewlettPackard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469–70, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525,
1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Second, contributory infringement can be viewed as a subset of
inducement of infringement—a narrower subset, but also a more clearly articulated one that,
at the time it was enacted, was the most common form of inducement. In effect, Congress
was defining circumstances that fell within the broad category of indirect infringement. In
many ways, this is no different than a dependant patent claim, which is a subset of, but not
rendered superfluous by, an independent patent claim. Cf. CHISUM, supra note 78,
§17.04[3] (commenting that §§ 271(b) and (c) appear to have been written in the form of an
independent and dependent claim, an unsurprising approach given the identity of the authors
of the 1952 Patent Act).
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has been subject to criticism on the grounds that it would “create a chilling
effect on competition,” forcing the public to pay the price of reduced
production and potentially higher prices.272
A second set of concerns relates to the appropriate allocation of
information costs as between patent holders and potential infringers. Under
a high fault requirement, virtually the entire burden for assessing whether
conduct infringes a patent falls on the patent holder’s shoulders.273 Yet in
many cases, a potential infringer may be in a better position to assess
whether it is engaging in infringing conduct, and thus for policy reasons
some of the informational burden should be placed on that entity.274 The
other extreme, however, allocates the entire burden to the accused
infringer—an undesirable approach that would impose heavy costs on even
basic productive activities.275
Thus, the crux of the problem is that requiring knowledge or purpose
under-deters infringing conduct, while a strict liability standard results in
the deterrence of lawful, productive activities. The solution is to recognize
that there is an intermediate option that allows for the precise calibration of
the standard to achieve optimal deterrence.276
By applying an objective standard tied to a high risk of infringement,
courts can set the deterrence effects to target activities that are highly likely
to lead to infringement while avoiding penalizing conduct that is unlikely
to lead to an infringement.
B. Assessing the Risk of Infringement
The crucial analysis thus becomes ascertaining the factors that go into
determining whether there is a high risk of infringement relative to the
precautions a potential infringer might take. I view it as a mistake to
answer this question with strong pronouncements of law. While it is useful
for courts—including the Federal Circuit—to recognize categories of

272. Holbrook, supra note 5, at 408.
273. Prior to DSU, Professor Oswald argued that adopting the Manville standard for
inducement (requiring intent or knowledge of infringement) unfairly placed the burden of
ascertaining infringement on the shoulders of the patentee, which she argued was contrary to
the purpose of the patent law. Oswald, supra note 5, at 244–45.
274. For example, the copycat may be better situated to recognize a risk that it is
infringing the patents marked on the copied product that it is copying than the patent holder,
who must invest non-trivial resources to even discover the potentially infringing product in
the first place.
275. See supra Part III.B.
276. See also Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and
Attorney’s Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 314 (2004)
(discussing deterrence in the context of willfulness). Although Professor Cotter’s analysis
was performed in the context of the pre-Seagate duty to obtain an opinion of counsel, and its
conclusions are directed to that issue, his discussion of under-deterrence and over-deterrence
is still relevant today. Id. at 315–26.
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relevant evidence, Federal Circuit opinions tend to be quick to invoke
statements of law. Such black and white assertions are inherently
dangerous, as discussed below in Part V.C. I also suggest, however, that it
is useful to look across doctrines when common fault issues are involved.
Particularly relevant to this question posed in this Article is the common
fault element shared by inducement of infringement, willful infringement,
and contributory infringement. Given that the underlying question
involved in all three doctrines is essentially the same, it makes sense to
recognize that the same evidence is relevant to an assessment of whether an
accused infringer possessed the requisite fault, regardless of the specific
doctrine.
Some risk factors are readily apparent, such as copying. One clearly
runs a significantly higher risk of patent infringement when copying
another’s product—especially if it is marked with patent numbers.
Likewise, the risk may also consider the duration of misconduct, receipt of
a notice letter, the content of the notice letter, and action taken by the
defendant upon receiving the notice letter. Internal emails from company
employees identifying the risk may also provide evidence that the risk was
indeed an objectively high one.277 High-risk conduct may also include that
of a former patent licensee who continues to engage in conduct covered by
a license despite its termination.278 Other relevant factors may be subject to
further development and discussion. Some will support a finding of high
risk; others will suggest the opposite.279
C. Avoiding the Trap of Omniscience
Although I suggest that the law should look to willful infringement when
attempting to identify factors that may be relevant to determining the risk
of infringement, I do not advocate a wholesale adoption of the willfulness
approach. This may at first seem somewhat surprising. The problem lies
277. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the jury saw e-mails between Microsoft employees
citing the ‘449 patent, upon which the jury could have reasonably inferred that Microsoft
knew about the patent), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
278. See Insituform Tech., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court had found that
defendants had instructed their licensees in 1992 to use an infringing patent, after the
defendants’ use of the infringing patent had terminated in 1991).
279. One additional benefit of the approach to fault for indirect infringement discussed
herein is that, because it focuses on the risk-causing activities as opposed to requiring an
assessment of whether the accused party knew that the third party conduct met all the
limitations of a particular patent claim, it could potentially result in a reduction of
administrative costs. Because the risk-causing activities would essentially provide a proxy
for the infringement assessment itself, for purposes of the fault element, courts would need
to only ascertain whether the accused party’s acts were those types of acts that are typically
considered “high risk” with respect to infringement, as opposed to the detailed, complex,
and often technology-specific inquiry required under the “knowledge” standard.
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in the way the Federal Circuit has applied the objective recklessness
standard to willful infringement: it has fallen into the trap of omniscience,
treating the objective inquiry as if it is made with respect to a being with
knowledge of everything, as opposed to a person in the accused party’s
position.
In the willfulness context, the Federal Circuit (despite appearing to adopt
an objective recklessness standard) has shifted far from engaging in an
actor-centric analysis of risk—a key component of the recklessness inquiry.
In re Seagate Technologies, LLC is a particularly significant case in the
evolution of the willful infringement doctrine over the last two decades. As
discussed above in Part II.B, in Seagate the Federal Circuit explicitly
adopted an objective recklessness standard for the knowledge-ofinfringement component.280 With respect to the question of infringement,
“a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.”281 Then, “the patentee must also
demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record
developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”282 In selecting
this standard, the court explicitly indicated it was seeking to adopt a civil
recklessness standard.283
Notwithstanding this apparent adoption of a recklessness standard, the
Federal Circuit’s measure of whether there is a high risk currently turns on
one question: whether the defenses presented by the accused infringer
during the litigation were reasonable.284 Thus willfulness turns not on an
280. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870–
71 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
281. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
282. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. The Federal Circuit has characterized the first
part of the recklessness test as an “objective inquiry,” id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870,
and the second part as “subjective,” see i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp, 598 F.3d 831,
860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (referring to the second prong as the
“subjective prong of Seagate”), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). This
characterization is inaccurate, as a “should have” standard is an objective standard. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit’s explicit adoption of a civil recklessness standard, see Seagate, 497 F.3d
at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870, cements this conclusion.
283. One deviation from the standard approach to recklessness is the Federal Circuit’s
characterization of the first prong as a “threshold” prong. Neither the Safeco case that the
Federal Circuit cited, nor standard tort treatises, characterize this as a “subjective” prong.
Rather, recklessness is simply a two-element test, where both elements must be proven. It
seems unlikely that the Federal Circuit was attempting to articulate a new recklessness
standard, at least initially. Rather, it may have been simply trying to point out to district
courts that they need not address both elements in disposing of willful infringement claims.
Cf. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1384, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1880 (Gajarasa, J., concurring)
(“Seagate’s subjective beliefs may become relevant only if Convolve successfully makes
this showing of objective unreasonableness.”).
284. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1337, 90
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1881 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The jury could have reasonably found for
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evaluation of the risk of infringement at the time the infringement occurred,
but on a post-hoc analysis of whether or not an omniscient accused
infringer would have recognized that it had a viable defense. Indeed,
several of the court’s opinions suggest that the risk should be evaluated
based on the defenses presented during litigation—not the defenses the
accused party developed prior to the litigation’s commencement, cementing
the apparent omniscience of accused infringers.285 While these cases cite
and quote from Seagate, their approach to recklessness is divorced from
traditional tort principles.286 For example, in DePuy Spine, Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamore Danek, Inc.,287 the Federal Circuit affirmed a district
court’s grant of JMOL of no willful infringement.288 In its appeal, DePuy
argued that the jury could have found that Medtronic copied the invention
directly out of its patent, and this was evidence of willfulness.289 The
Federal Circuit disagreed that this was relevant, concluding that
“knowingly copying” bears only on the second prong of the recklessness
inquiry, not on the objectively defined risk.290 Yet, as discussed above,
either party on the question of equivalence . . . [a]ccordingly, the district court was correct to
rule on JMOL that an objectively high likelihood of infringement could not have been found
under Seagate’s first prong.”); Cohesive Tech., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because ‘rigid’ was susceptible to a
reasonable construction under which Waters’s products did not infringe, there was not an
objectively high likelihood that Waters’s actions constituted infringement.”); see also Black
& Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 Fed. Appx. 284, 291 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Under this objective standard, both legitimate defenses to infringement claims and
credible invalidity arguments demonstrate the lack of an objectively high likelihood that a
party took actions constituting infringement of a valid patent.”); cf. i4i Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that the jury did not err in expressly rejecting Microsoft’s several defenses at trial,
including noninfringement and invalidity, and in finding willfulness and infringement in the
‘449 patent), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Spine Solutions, Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640,
1651 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the defendant’s argument that its defenses were
reasonable). The court’s emerging doctrine of objective baselessness in the context of
attorneys’ fee petitions (which the court has indicated mirrors the willfulness analysis)
suggests that the court continues to view willfulness in this light. See Old Reliable
Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d. 539, 544 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Unless an argument
or claim asserted in the course of litigation is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant
could believe it would succeed,’ it cannot be deemed objectively baseless for purposes of
awarding attorney fees under section 285.”).
285. For example, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in DePuy does not discuss whether the
accused infringer was actually aware of the equivalence issue. DePuy, 567 F.3d 1314, 90
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
286. See Ronald James Schutz & Brenda L. Joly, Proving Willful Infringement PostSeagate: Don’t Divorce the Willfulness Analysis from its Tort Foundations as an Intent
Inquiry, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 187, 190 (2009) (rebutting the sense that some statements in
Seagate indicate the court’s willingness to consider any reasonable defenses to preclude
willfulness by referencing the traditional meaning of willfulness in tort law).
287. 567 F.3d at 1314, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
288. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
289. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (“[T]o DePuy, knowingly copying a
competitor’s patented invention is objectively risky behavior of the highest order.”).
290. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (“Accordingly, evidence of copying in a case of
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copying is a behavior that, at a minimum, creates a significant risk of
infringement!
Rather than pursue this approach, which bears no connection to broader
notions of recklessness, or common sense, the court should instead reground its analysis in an actor-centric view of risk. In addition to tort
principles, the court should return to requiring a risk-based analysis that
depends solely on the existence, or lack thereof, of a non-frivolous defense.
In doing so, the court can readily draw both on the other doctrines
discussed herein as well as pre-Seagate cases on willful infringement,
whose facts identify risky behavior. For example, whether or not an
infringer copied the ideas or design of a patent has long been one of the
relevant factors of the willfulness analysis.291 Indeed, some scholars argue
that it is the purpose of the willful infringement doctrine,292 and as
discussed in Global-Tech, copying is relevant when assessing whether
there was a high risk of infringement. The goal of the recklessness analysis
should be to recognize that there are an array of facts that may have bearing
on whether or not there was a high degree of risk at the beginning of, and at
all points during, the infringement.
Likewise, practitioners and
commentators both should strive to identify relevant factors to broaden the
understanding of this issue. For example, it may be useful to look to the
Read “totality of the circumstances” factors for enhancing damages to
identify factors for assessing the two prongs of reckless patent
infringement.293 While these factors are not controlling—the “totality of
the circumstances” is largely a concept that has been used to determine
whether increased damages are warranted after a finding of willful

direct infringement is relevant only to Seagate’s second prong, as it may show what the
accused infringer knew or should have known about the likelihood of its infringement.”).
291. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1582, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[c]opying is evidence of willful
infringement”); Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 666, 206
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 498 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that copying is evidence of willful
infringement); Leesona Corp. v. United States, No. 130–70, 1978 WL 14862, at *20, 198
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4, 23 (Ct. Cl. May 1, 1978) (“Where the defendant has knowledge of and
copies plaintiff’s patented device, infringement of the patent is willful and wanton.”).
292. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 181, at 1118 (“Willfulness law is designed to
deter unscrupulous copyists from taking advantage of the patent disclosure in order to copy
the patentee’s invention and rush it to market.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent
Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1533 (2007) (arguing
that willful infringement should be defined instead as copying the technology from the
patent owner).
293. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1435–36 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For examples of commentators looking to Read, see Danny Prati,
In re Seagate Technology LLC: A Clean Slate for Willfulness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47,
66–70 (looking to the Read totality factors to shed light on willfulness); Kenneth R. Adamo
et al., The Curse of “Copying”, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 296, 301 (2008)
(drawing upon the Read totality factors to argue that copying should be relevant to willful
infringement).
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infringement has already been made294—and not all of them are relevant to
the question of fault,295 they do provide fodder for ideas and allow for a
more rigorous analysis.
D. An Objective Approach Conforms With the Normative Reality
The right way to understand fault in the context of indirect and willful
infringement is through an objective measure of risk, finding that fault is
present when the risk is high and obvious, and absent when the risk is
either low or not readily apparent. Irrespective of whether there is common
agreement on this issue, however, I suspect that it reflects the normative
reality of what is really going on when courts, judges, and juries are
making their assessments. In addition to the discussion in Part III.D.,
which suggests that courts aren’t really applying a purpose or knowledge
standard, a few additional cases illustrate this point.
Perhaps the most significant example is Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co.296 Despite the formal adoption of a
“knowledge” standard, the facts of Aro suggest that an obvious high risk is
enough to satisfy the fault requirement.297 In Aro, the defendant’s
“knowledge” that the conduct infringed was based on a letter from the
patent holder informing the defendant of the patent and stating that it was
“obvious” that their use would infringe the patent.298 Receiving a letter
from a competitor proclaiming the obviousness of infringement seems like
thin grounds on which to base the conclusion of “substantial certainty” of
infringement. Added to this was a dispute over whether the underlying

294. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858–59, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1963–64 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that Read sets forth the factors for enhancing
damages after a finding of willfulness is made), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011). The i4i opinion notwithstanding, numerous Federal Circuit opinions, including the
en banc court’s in Seagate, referenced the totality of the circumstances analysis as applying
to willful infringement. See, e.g., Acco Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., 501 F.3d
1307, 1311–12, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Willful infringement
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and is determined from the totality of
circumstances.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Over time, our cases evolved to evaluate willfulness and its
duty of due care under the totality of the circumstances, and we enumerated factors
informing the inquiry.”); Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH,
408 F.3d 1374, 1377, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referencing the
Read factors in the context of a willfulness determination).
295. Indeed, some of the Read factors have no relevance to either the degree of risk or
the accused infringer’s awareness of that risk. See Prati, supra note 293, at 67 (indicating
that the “behavior in litigation” and “motivation for harm” factors have no relevance to
either prong).
296. 377 U.S. 476, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 681 (1964).
297. See id. at 487–88, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 686 (finding that Aro’s infringing
conduct fits “perfectly” within the language of § 271(c), prohibiting the sale of patented
material).
298. Id. at 488–90, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 687–88.
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conduct constituted direct infringement at all,299 casting further doubt on
the existence of virtual certainty on the defendant’s part. Instead, the true
measure in Aro seems to be the existence of a high probability of
infringement, not certainty of that conclusion.
Inducement determinations also reflect this normative reality. Take, for
example, i4i v. Microsoft, in which the recited facts may suggest a high risk
that the use of Microsoft’s editor would infringe a specific patent but not
necessarily near certainty.300 In i4i, the evidence established that the
development team heard a presentation by i4i about software practicing
i4i’s patent, and that other Microsoft employees received a marketing email from i4i containing the patent number, were “familiar” with i4i’s
products, and believed that Microsoft Word’s custom XML editor would
render i4i’s product “obsolete.”301 Evidence of a risk that Microsoft’s own
XML editor might infringe i4i’s patent? Yes. Evidence that it was
virtually certain to infringe? No, at least on the facts described in the
opinion.
E. Inducement and Contributory Infringement Are Necessarily Willful
One final impact of this approach that should be noted is that findings of
contributory infringement and inducement of infringement necessarily lead
to findings of willful infringement.302 While on the surface this result may
seem somewhat odd,303 deeper inspection reveals that it is not. All three
doctrines are premised around the concept that the law should deter and
punish those who infringe (or cause others to infringe) a patent despite
some degree of fault that the conduct infringes.304 Furthermore, while one
might suggest that willfulness should require a higher degree of mental
culpability, or contributory infringement and inducement a lower degree,
neither is practical for the reasons already discussed. Indeed, in many
instances, although analyzing the issue separately, courts have held that

299. Id. at 484–85, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 685. In addition, the Court barely agreed on
whether the defendant met its knowledge standard, arriving at a 5–4 majority in favor that it
did.
300. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851–52, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1943, 1958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
301. Id. at 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958.
302. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 240 n.70 (arguing that under the Manville standard,
inducement will always be willful); Rader, supra note 5, at 331 (noting that Federal Circuit
precedent holds that liability for inducement does not have to rise to the level of willful
infringement).
303. See Rader, supra note 5, at 331 (arguing that adoption of the Hewlett-Packard
standard for inducement is necessary because it maintains the distinction between
inducement and willful infringement).
304. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 410 (arguing that the doctrines are aimed at
determining whether a party is morally culpable and whether the party should be punished
by the courts).
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contributory infringement and inducement of infringement can constitute
willful infringement.305 The more anomalous results are those where
inducement is found to not constitute willful infringement.306 There is no
reason why inducement—where a party causes another to engage in
infringing conduct despite knowing that the conduct infringes—should not
constitute willful infringement.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to explain why the conventional
approach to inducement and contributory infringement, which sees them as
a form of intentional tort complete with mental state inquiry, is inherently
problematic. In essence, I suggest that rather than continue to view the
fault elements of these doctrines as an individual question of subjective
knowledge or intent, the better approach is to recognize the inquiry for
what it is: an objective evaluation of whether a high risk of patent
infringement would have been obvious to another in the accused party’s
position. The use of this test seems not only to capture the normative
standard actually being applied by courts, but also can serve a valuable role
in obtaining the optimal level of deterrence of infringement-causing
behavior.

305. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 851–52, 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965
(affirming findings of contributory infringement, inducement, and willfulness), aff’d on
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
306. See, e.g., SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1381, 93
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (declining to find willfulness as a matter of
law despite finding inducement), aff’d sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). The Court did not address this issue in Global-Tech. Ultimately,
however, given the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech that inducement requires a
finding of knowledge of infringement, the continuation of the Federal Circuit’s practice of
affirming inducement but not willful infringement seems on especially shaky ground. Note
that having an independent doctrine of willful infringement remains important, as it is
relevant to direct infringement.

